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Abstract 
With a legal philosophical focus, this thesis examines the Court of Justice of the European 
Union’s development of principles, using the principles of direct effect and supremacy as 
examples, and the member states influential possibilities, focusing on the tools of non-referral 
and submitting observations. The theories of legal interpretivism and legal positivism have been 
applied, and in order to create a social context, the development of principles and the member 
state tools have been analysed from the perspectives of legal certainty and democracy. 
First, the differences between principles and rules have been studied. To legal interpretivists 
there is a clear distinction between the two, while for legal positivists, a distinction is not 
appropriate. The role of principles has then been examined, mainly from the viewpoint of the 
CJEU. Also, the development of principles, from the perspective of legal interpretivism and 
positivism, are examined along with its compliance with democracy. 
The tools of non-referral and submitting observations have also been examined. Courts may 
refrain from referring questions to the CJEU if the provisions in question fulfil certain criteria, 
the most common exempt being the acte clair doctrine. When national courts refrain from 
posing questions to the CJEU, they effectively limit the Court’s power to develop principles. 
Non-referral could therefore be seen as an important tool for national courts. However, it only 
takes one question from one court for the CJEU to have the possibility to rule on a certain 
matter. The second tool, to submit observations to the CJEU, is a possibility for member states 
to argue their favoured interpretation of the Union law and possibly affect the Court’s rulings. 
Even though the incentive might be great, the tool has been scarcely used. In cases where 
member states do submit observations, the Court does not rule accordingly in a majority of 
cases.  
If one looks at the tools from an efficiency point of view, it is clear that using the non-referral 
tool is, in theory, very efficient if member states want to influence the development of 
principles. In practice, though, that is not the case. For the submitting observations-tool, the 
CJEU infrequently rules in line with the member state interpretation. From that perspective, the 
effectiveness of the tool might not be as great as the member states might want.  
The concept of legal certainty and democracy, from the perspective of legal interpretivism and 
legal positivism, have been applied to the two tools of non-referral and submitting observations. 
Concerning legal certainty from a legal interpretivists point of view, the two tools are not in 
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line with it. For legal positivist, however, the two tools can be seen as in line with legal certainty. 
On the concept of democracy, the legal interpretivist notion is a strive towards freedom.  The 
non-referral tool is not in line with that notion. Concerning member state observations, the same 
can be concluded. From a legal positivist perspective, the goal with democracy is unity. In that 
sense, non-referral could be in line with it since the tool can be used by member states to 
increase stability and unity within the state. Submitting observations could also be seen as in 
line with democracy. Both the development of principles by the CJEU and the member states’ 
potential influence through the two tools can thus be seen as in line with the two values, 
depending on which theory one emanates from.  
 
Keywords: CJEU, principles, legal interpretivism, legal positivism, direct effect, supremacy, 
non-referral, submitting observations, legal certainty, democracy. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background, or once upon a time 
The concept of principles is a well-established topic within the philosophy of law. It is common 
practice that national and international courts refer to principles in their rulings. The study of 
principles has been referred to by von Bogdandy and Bast as a “well-established way to deepen 
the understanding of a legal subject.”1 The same scholars have also proclaimed principles to 
“form the epicentre of a legal scholarship striving for autonomy and searching for a disciplinary 
proprium behind the multifariousness of norms and judgments.”2 Furthermore, they emphasise 
that principles “strengthen the role of courts vis-á-vis politics.”3 It would therefore be safe to 
presume that principles play an important role within the judicial practice. 
The concept of judge-made principles is, however, a more intricate matter. It is news to no one 
that courts themselves have developed principles throughout history in their rulings. A well-
known example is the principle that one should not benefit from one’s own wrongdoing, 
established by the New York Court of Appeals in the Riggs v Palmer case from 1889.4 The 
practice of creating principles as a court could though, according to some scholars, be 
characterised as judicial activism, hence a judicial chore not as accepted as a mere reference to 
already politically established principles.5 There are frames which courts should stay within, 
and for judges to create principles might count as being more than just “la bouche qui prononce 
les paroles de la loi”.6  
The practice of establishing and developing principles is not limited to national courts, as it can 
also be found on the international arena. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or 
‘the Court’) has throughout the history of the European Union (EU or the Union) been 
developing principles in its rulings. These principles have helped shape and define the 
competence and scope of the EU and CJEU. The most important principles are the principle of 
direct effect and the principle of supremacy. Scholars like Groussot have inter alia pointed out 
                                                 
1 von Bogdandy, A., Bast, J., Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd rev. ed., Oxford, Hart, 2010) p. 11. 
2 Ibid., p. 12. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Riggs v Palmer; 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889). 
5 See infra, note 9. 
6 Kolb, R., ‘Principles as Sources of International Law (with Special Reference to Good Faith)’ (2006) 53:1 
Netherlands International Law Review, 1, p. 2, referring to Montesquieu, C-L., L'esprit Des Lois (Paris: Garnier 
Freres, 1851), liv. XI, Cap. VI. 
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the extraordinary influence that the Court has, through its development of said principles, on 
the development of Union law.7  
With principles like direct effect and supremacy having such an immense influence on the entire 
EU and its member states, it is important to examine what chances member states have on 
influencing the CJEU’s development of principles. This because the establishing and 
developing of principles affect the entire aquis fundamentally and the fact that principles might 
be equating to law, making member states bound by something that they might not agree on. 
Also, as Dowrick expressed it, “[t]o leave [principles] out of an analysis of EC law into its 
elements would be like leaving oxygen out of an analysis of air.”8 
 
1.2. Aim, or the meaning of it all 
This thesis has three targets. First, to examine the legal interpretivist and legal positivist views 
on principles – what they are, how they are created and how their creation conforms with the 
theories’ notions of democracy – and connect that to the CJEU’s development of the principles 
of direct effect and supremacy. Second, to scrutinise the member states’ possible influence on 
the CJEU’s process to develop principles, especially the principles of direct effect and 
supremacy, through the preliminary reference procedure, focusing on the tools of non-referral 
and submitting of observations. Third, to apply the concepts of legal certainty and democracy, 
from the legal interpretivist and legal positivist point of view, on the tools of non-compliance 
and submitting observations. The aim is, through contributing with the aforementioned, to 
provide a deeper understanding for the reader concerning the CJEU’s development of principles 
and member states’ influential possibilities. 
                                                 
7 “It is indicative of the extraordinary influence that the Court of Justice has had on the development of Community 
law that the main principles which define the constitutional structure of the Community are not provided for 
expressly in the Treaty but where discovered by the Court by an inductive process. This applies in particular to the 
principles of primacy and direct effect, which in the Court’s own language form the essential characteristics of the 
Community legal order.” Groussot, X., Creation, Development and Impact of the General Principles of 
Community Law: Towards a Jus Commune Europaeum? (Lund, Xavier Groussot, 2005), p. 15, note 40, referring 
to Tridimas, T., The General Principles of EU Law (2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006); On that note, 
see also Hartley, “[a] common tactic is to introduce a new doctrine gradually: in the first case that comes before 
it, the Court will establish the doctrine as a general principle, but suggest that it is subject to various qualifications; 
the Court may even find some reason why it should not be applied to the particular facts of the case. The principle, 
however, is now established. If there are not too many protests, it will be re-affirmed in later cases; the 
qualifications can then be whittled away and the full extent of the doctrine be revealed” Hartley, T., The foundation 
of European Community (8th ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 81-82. 
8 Dowrick, F. E., ‘A model of the European Communities’ Legal System’ (1983) 3:1 Yearbook of European Law, 
169, p. 219. 
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To clarify, the questions that are going to be answered are: How does legal interpretivists and 
legal positivists define the concept of principles? Is the CJEU’s development of principles in 
line with the concept of democracy, according to legal interpretivist and legal positivists? How 
does the member state use the tools of non-referral and submitting observations in order to 
influence the CJEU’s development of principles, and how effective are they? Are the tools of 
non-referral and submitting observations in line with legal certainty and democracy, according 
to legal interpretivists and legal positivists? 
 
1.3. Scope and limitations, or everything but this 
For the purpose of this thesis, it has been necessary to include several limitations. First, this text 
will not discuss whether the action of creating principles is within the competence of the Court, 
or if it is to be considered judicial activism.9  
Second, only member states’ influence on judge-made principles will be examined. A further 
limitation concerning which principles to examine has also been necessary to include, in order 
for the scope of the thesis not to be too broad. The thesis will use the principles of direct effect 
and supremacy as examples. They were chosen for several reasons. They were both created and 
developed by the CJEU (which is the type of principles that this thesis focuses on), they are the 
two undisputedly most important principles in the EU legal order,10 and it is quite impossible 
to only chose one of them since they are like two sides of the same euro coin. They are 
habitually considered in conjunction, and will be in this thesis as well. 
Third, only two theories will be applied; legal interpretivism and legal positivism. There are 
numerous other theories that would be possible to apply on this topic, however, since the focal 
point is principles, it seemed the most logic to choose these two.11 Within those theories, there 
are several scholars with their own interpretation and orientation. In order for the thesis not to 
                                                 
9 Many scholars have addressed this topic, see for example Rasmussen, H., On law and policy in the European 
Court of Justice. A comparative study in judicial policy making (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986); 
Pollicino, O., ‘Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice in the Context of Principle of Equality between Judicial 
Activism and Self-Restraint’ (2004) German Law Journal, 283; Dawson, M., de Witte, B., Muir, E., (eds.) Judicial 
activism at the European Court of justice (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, cop, 2013 Davies, G., ‘Activism Relocated. 
The Self-restraint of the European Court of Justice in Its National Context’ (2012) 19:1 Journal of European Public 
Policy, 76; Lenaerts, K., ‘How the ECJ Thinks: A Study on Judicial Legitimacy’ (2013) 36:5 Fordham 
International Law Journal, 1302. 
10 They are e.g. classified as being defining characteristics of EU law by de Witte; de Witte, B., ‘Direct Effect, 
Primacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order’ in Craig, P., de Búrca, G., (eds.) The evolution of EU law (2nd ed., 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 324; For a deeper discussion, see infra, section 1.4.3. 
11 See infra, section 1.4.2. 
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digress more than necessary, Dworkin has been chosen as the main representative for the legal 
interpretivist theory, and H. L. A. Hart for the legal positivism, due to their prominence in the 
field. 
Fourth, even though the chosen tools in section three not only concern legal matters, but also 
political ones, this is not to be seen as an interdisciplinary thesis. Also, it is important to note 
that the tools under scrutiny by no means are the only tools for member states to use, there are 
both other judicial and political tools available.12 The choice to focus on the preliminary ruling 
procedure, and the tools that it brings, was mainly due to it being one of the most important 
instruments for communication between the Court and the member state.13 Even though there 
has been countless books and articles written about the procedure, and everything it 
encompasses, there are still questions worthy of discussing. 
Fifth, the preliminary references themselves, and e.g. how the national courts frame them, will 
not be up for scrutiny. However, a vast study on that area – how national courts talk to the 
CJEU, and how that may affect the outcome of the Court’s rulings – is being conducted 
presently,14 and could, for future reference, be applied on this thesis when done to complete the 
picture of member state influence through tools made available under the preliminary ruling 
procedure. 
 
1.4. Method and material, or how it was done and what have been used 
One great flaw to a thesis would be to boldly claim to have used a certain method, and then 
applying a different one. In order to avoid that, one can instead just explain what has been done 
and let the reader draw the conclusion. There is, however, a value in labelling the method for 
the thesis, namely to be transparent to the reader, and to set the scientific frameworks from the 
outset. It is also a way for the writer to show that she comprehends the task entrusted to her. 
                                                 
12 For example, concerning political tools, member states can appoint judges to the CJEU who has the “right” 
policy preferences, and/or make it clear to that person that he or she will not be reappointed if national interests 
are disregarded in important or systematic ways; see Stone Sweet, A., The Judicial Construction of Europe (1st 
ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 26. Concerning judicial tools, there are for example, the possibility 
to amend the Treaties. 
13 See infra, section 1.4.4.; Craig and de Búrca states that the relationship between the CJEU and the member states 
is reference-based; Craig, P., de Búrca, G., EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (6th ed., Oxford: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2015), p. 464. 
14 The study is conducted by Anna Wallerman, the first article will be published in January 2018; Wallerman, A., 
'Referring Court Influence in the Preliminary Ruling Procedure: The Swedish Example’ in Derlén, M., Lindholm, 
J., (eds.) The Court of Justice of the European Union: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (forthcoming, 2018). 
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This is, thus, a tentative description of this thesis’ method and material, or an answer to how it 
was done and what have been used.  
 
1.4.1. EU legal method 
It must be remembered that due to the theme, EU law, the EU legal method will permeate the 
entire thesis.15 The legal sources within the EU legal order are primarily primary and secondary 
legislation.16 The primary legislation consists of the EU treaties,17 general principles, and 
international agreements.18 The secondary legislation includes regulations, directives, decisions 
recommendations and opinions.19 In addition to the primary and secondary legislation, the legal 
sources also consist of CJEU case law and soft law.20 The sources are listed in the proper 
hierarchical order, and lower sources are only valid if they are consistent with the acts or 
agreements that have precedence over them.21 
This thesis will mainly use CJEU case law as its main source, in addition to the legal doctrine. 
The CJEU mainly uses a teleological interpretational method when assessing the EU legal 
sources.22 When using that method, the Court strives at fostering the purpose of the provisions, 
counteracting possible unreasonable consequences that may arise from a literal interpretation, 
and to fill in possible gaps in the Union law.23 This approach will be taken into account when 
analysing the CJEU case law and the actions from the Court from a legal interpretivist and legal 
positivist viewpoint. 
 
                                                 
15 For more on the EU legal method, see Hettne, J., Otken Eriksson, I., EU-rättslig Metod: Teori Och Genomslag 
I Svensk Rättstillämpning (2nd rev. ed., Stockholm, Norstedts Juridik, 2011). 
16 European Parliament, ‘Sources and scope of European Union law’, last updated October 2017, retrieved 8-11 
December 2017, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_1.2.1.html  
17 Including not only the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), but also the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom); European Parliament, ‘Sources and scope of 
European Union law’, supra note 16.  
18 International agreements are however subordinate to both the Treaties and the general principles; European 
Parliament, ‘Sources and scope of European Union law’, supra note 16. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Soft law is non-legally enforceable instruments that are used for the interpretation and/or application of EU law; 
European Parliament, ‘Sources and scope of European Union law’, supra note 16. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Livsmedelsverket, ’EU-rättsliga rättskällor och tolkningsmetoder’, last updated 27 January 2017, retrieved 18 
December 2017, available at https://kontrollwiki.livsmedelsverket.se/artikel/88/eu-rattsliga-rattskallor-och-
tolkningsmetoder 
23 Ibid. 
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1.4.2. Applied theories 
The theory of legal interpretivism is a theory based on principles.24 When analysing the use of 
principles thoroughly, the theory of legal interpretivism ought to be part of the analysis. In order 
to create a proper discussion, since legal interpretivism is not the only theory that can be applied 
on the analysis of principles, at least one more theory would need to be applied. Even though 
the comparative method is by no means de rigueur to use in a thesis, there are clear advantages 
to use it in this context. When analysing the CJEU’s development of principles, and member 
states’ possible influence on the process, different conclusions can be drawn based on the theory 
one choses. To only apply one theory could therefore give a distorted image of the reality – that 
that result and conclusion is the objectively right answer. In order to create a meaningful 
discussion with, reasonably, contrasting principles, the legal interpretivism, and Dworkin’s 
version in particular, could gain from being compared with legal positivism. 
Legal interpretivism and legal positivism are, in some areas, stark contrasts to one another. 
They are, however, not so fundamentally different that a comparison would be that of apples 
and oranges. This partly because Dworkin has been seen, by some scholars, as a (critical) legal 
positivist25 and Hart as a (positive) interpretivist.26 Also, several opuses of Dworkin were 
written as a reaction to the ideas presented by Hart and the legal positivism,27 and Hart’s 
postscript in “The concept of law” was a direct reply to Dworkin.28An application of these two 
theories would therefore provide with a comprehensive image of the topic.  
The theories will first be applied to the concept of principles, the CJEU’s development of 
principles, and its possible conformity with democracy. Since both theories have different 
notions on this, both concepts need to be kept in mind when later aiming the attention at the 
member states’ influential possibilities. The tools of non-referral and submitting observations, 
and the use of them in relation to legal certainty and democracy, is contingent on which theory 
one embraces. Both theories will thus be applied, since there is no objectively right conclusion 
to draw. 
                                                 
24 See infra. 
25 See e.g. Tuori, K., Critical Legal Positivism (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2002). 
26 See e.g. Bódig, M., ‘The Issue of Normativity and the Methodological Implications of Interpretivism I: The Idea 
of Normative Guidance’ (2013) 54:2 Acta Juridica Hungarica, 119, p. 121. 
27 E.g. Dworkin’s “The model of rules”; Dworkin, R., ‘The Model of Rules’ (1967) 35 The University of Chicago 
Law Review. 
28 Hart, H. L. A., The concept of law (3rd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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It is arguably impossible to answer the research questions of this thesis through simply applying 
a legal dogmatic method.29 A theoretic perspective therefore needs to be applied. Should 
someone argue that there is an objectively right answer to, for example, what a principle is, he 
or she would not find support amongst the scholars. Whether one adheres to it or not, one or 
more theories would be necessary to apply to an examination on the concept of principles. The 
gain of being transparent concerning the application of theories is thus that the reader knows 
the frames from the beginning, since there will be theoretical frames even if the writer does not 
choose to state it. 
Having argued the need for theories, and why legal interpretivism and legal positivism has been 
selected in this thesis, the two theories are going to be properly introduced. 
 
Legal interpretivism 
Interpretivism about law offers a philosophical explanation of how institutional 
practice -the legally significant action and practices of political institutions- modifies 
legal rights and obligations.30 
The legal interpretivism is a theory focused on the grounds of law; i.e. legal rights and 
obligations. Any legal right or obligation generates a need for institutional practice, which has 
resulted in its thesis that the law is affected by institutional practice through certain principles 
that, in turn, explain the role of the practice.31 Legal interpretivism is classified as a natural law, 
in the sense that it claims that not just institutional practice, but also moral plays a significant 
role in the development of law.32 In particular, legal interpretivism states that there should not, 
and cannot, be a distinction between law and moral. Due to this position, the legal interpretivism 
theory concerns law to be an interpretive concept.33 The protagonist of the legal interpretivism 
is Dworkin. To him, law does not only consist of rules, but also of principles and even politics.34 
The difference between rules and principles, according to Dworkin, will be examined further.35  
                                                 
29 On the legal dogmatic method, see e.g. Kleineman, J., ’Rättsdogmatisk metod’ in Korling, F., Zamboni, M., 
(reds.) Juridisk Metodlära (1st ed., Lund, Studentlitteratur, Exaktaprinting, 2013). 
30 Stavropoulos, N., ‘Legal interpretivism’ (2016) 10 Problema, 23, p. 25. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., p. 26. 
33 Plunkett, D., Sundell, T., ‘Dworkin's Interpretivism and the Pragmatics of Legal Disputes’ (2013) 19:3 Legal 
Theory, 242, p. 243. 
34 Lübcke, G., et al., Filosofilexikonet - en Uppslagsbok: Filosofer och filosofiska begrepp från A till Ö (Stockholm, 
Forum, 1988), p. 482. 
35 See infra, section 2.1.1. 
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Legal positivism 
Concerning philosophical theories, legal positivism is one of the leading theories of the nature 
of law.36 The main theses for legal positivists are that the law’s content and existence is fully 
dependent on social facts,37 and that law is not dependent on its merits or demerits, i.e. that 
there is no connection, or at least no necessary connection, between morality and law.38 The 
evident distinction between legal positivism and legal interpretivism is thus their notion of the 
connection between law and moral, where legal positivists clearly oppose moral affecting or 
being part of the development of law. 
Legal positivism was first developed by utilitarian Jeremy Bentham, and is today most 
associated with H. L. A. Hart or Kelsen.39 Hart argues that law consists of primary and 
secondary rules.40 Primary rules are applicable to actions, they impose duties to do or to not do 
something. Secondary rules, on the other hand, are meta-rules that create or modify primary 
rules, and they govern the conference of powers to officials.41 Hart’s most famous secondary 
rule is his rule of recognition, which establishes the fundamental criteria of legal validity.42  
 
1.4.3. Selected principles 
As has been stated above,43 the principles focused on in this thesis are the principle of direct 
effect and the principle of supremacy. The principle of direct effect was founded by the Court 
in the van Gend case,44 which to this day is arguably the most famous case of the CJEU.45 In 
the case, the Court stated that EU law provisions can confer legal rights to individuals, which 
public authorities are required to respect and national courts obligated to protect.46 The term 
                                                 
36 Sevel, M., Leiter, B., ‘Legal Positivism’ (2010) Philosophy, Oxford University Press, last modified 10 May 
2010. 
37 In this context, social facts consist of fact about human behaviour and intentions; Sevel, M., Leiter, B., ‘Legal 
Positivism’, supra note 36. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Choi, N., ‘Interpretivism in Jurisprudence: What Difference Does the Philosophy of History Make to the 
Philosophy of Law?’ (2007) 1:3 Journal of the Philosophy of History, 365, p. 377-78. 
41 Choi, N., ‘Interpretivism in Jurisprudence: What Difference Does the Philosophy of History Make to the 
Philosophy of Law?’, supra note 40, p. 377-78. 
42 See infra, section 2.3.2.; Sevel, M., Leiter, B., ‘Legal Positivism’, supra note 36. 
43 See supra, section 1.3. 
44 Case C-26/62 van Gend en Loos v Administratie der Belastingen (1963) ECLI:EU:C:1963:1. 
45 Craig, P., de Búrca, G., EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, supra note 13, p. 187. 
46 Case C-26/62 van Gend en Loos, supra note 44. 
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direct effect thus equated “the immediate enforceability by individual applicants of those 
provisions in national courts”.47 In order to reach that conclusion, the Court reasoned partly 
from the Treaty text, especially the preamble, and from the vision of the Community that the 
Treaties seemed designed to establish.48 In order for a provision to have direct effect, certain 
criteria must be met. The provision needs to be clear and unconditional, and without any 
reservation on the part of the member state in question.49 Through the van Gend case, The Court 
also, famously, established the “new legal order” of the Community,50 further confirming the 
case’s status as the most famous case of the CJEU. 
The principle of supremacy was founded by the CJEU in the Costa case.51 It dictates the 
relationship between EU law and national law; in the case of a conflict between an EU legal 
rule and a national legal rule, the former must be given primacy. This conclusion was reached 
through a teleological interpretation of the Treaties, where the Court analysed the aims and 
spirit of the Treaties.52 The Court further cemented the principle of supremacy in the 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft and the Simmenthal cases.53 
Barring both principles being considered the most important principles concerning the creation 
of the Union legal order and the constitutional structure of the Union,54 they patently have an 
immense direct impact on the member states. For the member states, then, it would seemingly 
be of great importance to have a possibility to influence the development of those principles. 
For that reason, this thesis will focus on the principles of direct effect and supremacy, rather 
than any other CJEU-developed principle, when exemplifying the topic of principles. 
  
1.4.4. Used tools 
The third section consists of an examination of the two member state tools of non-referral and 
submitting observations. For this part, an empirical method has been applied. The chosen 
                                                 
47 Craig, P., de Búrca, G., EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, supra note 13, p. 189. 
48 Ibid., p. 189. 
49 Case C-26/62 van Gend en Loos, supra note 44; Craig, P., de Búrca, G., EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 
supra note 13, p. 190. 
50 Case C-26/62 van Gend en Loos, supra note 44. 
51 Case C-6/64 Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. (1964) ECLI:EU:C:1964:66. 
52 Case C-6/64 Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L., supra note 51; Craig, P., de Búrca, G., EU Law: Text, Cases, and 
Materials, supra note 13, p. 268. 
53 Case C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel (1970) ECLI:EU:C:1970:114; Case C-106/77 Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal 
(1978) ECLI:EU:C:1978:49. 
54 See supra, note 7. 
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member state tools are both connected to the preliminary ruling procedure, they were selected 
for that reason. The preliminary ruling procedure is the most important procedure concerning 
the interaction between the CJEU and the member states.55 It is also almost exclusively through 
this procedure that the Court has been able to develop principles.56 When analysing the CJEU’s 
development of principles, and the member states’ influential possibilities, not focusing on the 
preliminary ruling procedure and the tools that it enables would be problematic. 
Non-referral could easily be dismissed since the influential possibilities might seem obvious. If 
a national court does not refer a question for preliminary ruling to the CJEU, the CJEU cannot 
interpret EU law and, in that case, develop principles. However, there are important aspects of 
this tool that will be examined in this thesis, that go beyond the first obvious appearance. First, 
it is important to point at this as being a vastly spread-out tool, used by national courts 
throughout the Union.57 There are also issues connected with the use of this tool, both from the 
perspective of national courts and the CJEU, and the development of the EU legal order, that is 
highlighted here.58 Instead of just stating the primarily obvious, that non-referral limits the 
CJEU’s possibilities at developing principles, this thesis will provide an in-depths analysis 
concerning all intricate elements concerning the non-referral tool. This will also be reflected 
upon from the legal interpretivist and legal positivist’s point of view regarding the two 
perspectives of legal certainty and democracy, with the hope of providing with an approche 
innovant. 
When analysing member state observations, compared to the non-referral tool, there is no as 
fast-reaching conclusion. This tool has been quantitively studied by many scholars over the 
course of the development of the Union.59 The possible outcome, and influential possibilities 
both from an empirical perspective and from a theoretical perspective will be provided. Also, 
as with the non-referral, the submitting observation-tool will be reflected upon from the legal 
interpretivist and legal positivist’s point of view regarding the two perspectives of legal 
certainty and democracy. 
                                                 
55; Craig, P., de Búrca, G., EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, supra note 13, p. 464. 
56 Ibid.; There should, however, be remembered that there are other procedures from which the CJEU can develop 
principles though less used, for instance during direct proceedings against EU institutions (see e.g. Case C-402/05 
P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission (2008) ECLI:EU:C:2008:461), and 
in opinions of international treaties (see e.g. The Court’s opinion 1/91, ECLI:EU:C:1991:490) 
57 See infra, section 3.1. 
58 See infra, section 3.1.4. 
59 See infra, sections 3.2.2. and 3.2.3. 
11 
 
1.4.5. Chosen perspectives 
Two perspectives will be applied on the chosen member state tools in order to provide with a 
deeper understanding of the issue and to put it in a social context, like a concrete icing on an 
abstract legal cake. The perspectives chosen are legal certainty and democracy. 
Democracy is one of the Union’s key values.60 It is also a highly debated topic in relation to the 
decision-making within the Union.61 Principles are, as has been mentioned in the 
1.4.1-subsection and will be confirmed in the second section, part of the primary law and thus 
the EU legal order, and the development of them are in some sense to be considered 
development of law. Because of that, the development of principles, and consequently the 
member states’ influential possibilities on that process, could be up for questioning on whether 
or not it has a democratic baring. Therefore, the perspective of democracy was chosen as one 
of two perspectives in this thesis. 
Concerning legal certainty, the standpoint of this thesis is legal certainty from a perspective of 
legitimate expectations. This is in line with the literature and CJEU case law.62 Legitimate 
expectations shall be seen from the two theories’ perspective, hence what legal interpretivists 
and legal positivists consider that EU members can expect from a court or a member state. 
Legal certainty is an immensely important concept in a legal system.63 It has not been defined 
in the EU Treaties, but has, however, been referred to by the CJEU in its case law.64 Due to the 
importance of the legal certainty, it was chosen as the second perspective in this thesis. 
 
                                                 
60 TEU Preamble. 
61 Craig, P., de Búrca, G., EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, supra note 13, p. 151. 
62 On literature, see e.g. Schermers, H., Waelbroeck, D., Rijksuniversiteit Te Leiden, Europa Instituut. Judicial 
Protection in the European Communities (5th ed., Deventer, Kluwer, 1992), p. 65-69 Raitio, J., ‘The Principle of 
Legal Certainty as a General Principle of EU Law’ in Bernitz, U., Nergelius, J., Cardner, L., (eds.) General 
Principles of EC Law in a Process of Development: Reports from a conference Stockholm, 23-24 march 2007 
organised by the Swedish Network for European Legal Studies (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 
2008), p. 10; Craig, P., de Búrca, G., EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, supra note 13, p. 558; on CJEU case 
law, see e.g. Case C-2/75 Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel v Mackprang (1975) 
ECLI:EU:C:1975:66, para. 4; Case C-316/86 Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas v Krücken (1988) 
ECLI:EU:C:1988:201, para. 23. 
63 See e.g. Radbruch, G., ‘Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law’ (1946, this version printed 2006) 26:1 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 1, p.6. Radbruch referred to legal certainty as one of the three fundamental pillars 
of law. 
64 See e.g. Case C-42/59 S.N.U.P.A.T. v High Authority (1961) ECLI:EU:C:1961:5, p. 87; Case C-58/85 Ethicon 
v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe (1986) ECLI:EU:C:1986:128, para. 10, 12; Case C-40/88 Weber v Milchwerke Paderborn-
Rimbeck (1989) ECLI:EU:C:1989:214, para 13; Case C-323/88 Sermes v Directeur des services des douanes de 
Strasbourg (1990) ECLI:EU:C:1990:299, para 14-18; Case C-201/02 Wells (2004) ECLI:EU:C:2004:12, para. 40, 
54-60. 
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1.4.6. In substance 
Principles 
Some would say that the classification of legal principles was first made by Esser and, later, 
Larenz.65 The section on principles,66 however, follow the delimitation made by Alexy in his 
article “On the structure of Legal Principles”,67 and depart from Dworkin’s theory. This is also 
in line with the application of the chosen theories. 
For section 2.2, the setup will mainly follow the setup in Raz’s article “Legal principles and the 
limits of law”.68 This is mostly due to pedagogical reasons, as Raz uses a setup that is easy for 
the reader to follow and appreciate. For subsection 2.2.1, concerning the CJEU and its 
development of principles, the main scholars chosen in this thesis are Bernitz, Brunell, Garrett, 
Groussot, Gutiérrez-Fons, Lennaerts, Nergelius, Pollack, Stone Sweet, Tridimas, and 
Widdershoven. This is due to their prominence within the EU legal field, especially in relation 
to principles. 
 
Non-referral 
The examples in this section were chosen for several reasons. First, the examples from the 
Conseil d’Etat and the Bundesfinanzhof were chosen in order to reflect the view that is held by 
some scholars, that France and Germany are amongst the member states that tend not to refer 
questions to a slightly larger extent than other countries.69 The example from the 
Regeringsrätten was chosen to provide diversity to the otherwise (easily) central/southern 
European focus. It also signifies that no major differences can be found between older and 
newer members of the Union concerning the non-referral. Even though all cases involve 
different areas of EU law, they all concern the principles of direct effect and supremacy. Since 
the examples are presented as a way to illustrate the concept of non-referral, not too much 
emphasis is put on them. Therefore, the selection process, which involved considerations of 
geographical and historical measures, is to be seen as sufficient for this purpose. Consequently, 
                                                 
65 See e.g. Avila, H., Theory of Legal Principles (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), ch 2. 
66 Section 2.1. 
67 “The distinction between rules and principles had already been thoroughly considered in Germany by Joseph 
Esser during the 1950s, albeit with a slightly different terminology. […] Still, it was Ronald Dworkin’s major 
challenge to H. L. A. Hart’s version of legal positivism initially in “The Model of Rules,” that marked the 
beginnings of a broad discussion.” Alexy, R., ‘On the Structure of Legal Principles’ (2000) 13: 3 Ratio Juris, 294, 
p. 294. 
68 Raz, J., ‘Legal Principles and the Limits of Law’ (1972) 81:5 Yale Law Journal, 823. 
69 Bengoetxea, J., The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice: Towards a European Jurisprudence 
(New York, Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 201-02. 
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had other cases been chosen, the image illustrated might have been slightly different, but the 
over-all result would have remained the same since it is not hinged on the examples. 
 
Submitting observations 
It is important to acknowledge that in the study from Swedish Institute for European Policy 
Studies (Sieps),70 no distinction was made between questions referred which concerned 
principles and those which did not. This means that the result must not mirror the actual 
situation and influential rate that member states have concerning the development of principles. 
Also, the study includes cases between 1997-2008, which do not include the “prime” years of 
the development of the principles of direct effect and supremacy.71 It could therefore present 
slightly misguiding results when applied in this context. However, the study does give an 
indication of the effects of member state observations on the procedures before the Court, and 
is to be used as such. 
Concerning the examples mentioned on member state observations, it is highly important to 
acknowledge that the information is gathered from the CJEU judgments. For the purpose of this 
thesis, a request was made to the European Commission asking for the actual national 
submissions. Unfortunately, due to the extreme increase in requests, as a result of the 
Commission v Breyer’s case72 from this summer, they have not been able to provide the 
requested documents within the timeframes of this thesis. The opinions and suggestive 
interpretations provided by the member states are therefore “filtered” through the CJEU. As 
was brought into attention by the Sieps study, the CJEU does not refer to all observations made 
                                                 
70 Cramér, P., et al, ‘See you in Luxembourg? EU Governments’ observations under the Preliminary Reference 
Procedure’ (2016) 5 Sieps. 
71 The main cases concerning development of the principles of direct effect and supremacy happened between the 
60’s and the beginning of the 90’s, with a boom during the 70s and 80s with cases like Case C-9/70 Grad v 
Finanzamt Traunstein (1970) ECLI:EU:C:1970:78; Case C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, supra note 
53; Case C-4/73 Nold KG v Commission (1974) ECLI:EU:C:1974:51; Case C-41/74 Van Duyn v Home Office 
(1974) ECLI:EU:C:1974:133; Case C-43/75 Defrenne v Sabena (1976) ECLI:EU:C:1976:56; Case C-106/77 
Simmenthal, supra note 53; Case C-147/78 Ratti (1979) ECLI:EU:C:1979:110; Case C-14/83 von Colson and 
Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (1984) ECLI:EU:C:1984:153; Case C-152/84 Marshall v Southampton and 
South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority (1986) ECLI:EU:C:1986:84; Case C-106/89 Marleasing v 
Comercial Internacional de Alimentación (1990) ECLI:EU:C:1990:395; Case C-188/89 Foster and Others v 
British Gas (1990) ECLI:EU:C:1990:313; Case C-213/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte 
Factortame (1990) ECLI:EU:C:1990:257.  
72 The result of the case was that it is now easier to request copies of member state observations, which up until 
then had been deemed classified as a starting point; Case C-213/15 P Commission v Breyer (2017) 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:563. 
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by the member states, but “picks and chooses as it deems suitable”.73 Even though one could 
hope that the Court presents all arguments without leaving negative opinions out, or distorting 
the actual meaning of the observations, the risk of the presented observations in the rulings 
being a biased sample is present. 
For subsection 3.2.4, the cases that are examined were chosen due to their importance, 
pedagogical value and relevancy to the topic of the thesis. The pedagogical value is made 
apparent when the cases are read as examples of when the member states’ view on the principles 
of direct effect and supremacy, and the opposition or agreement of the further development of 
them, is clear, and where the CJEU acknowledges and responds to the views. In other words, 
in these cases the opinion of both member states and the CJEU are clearly visible in the material. 
All examples chosen have had a maximum of three member state observations. The choice of 
not including cases with more observations was made because the cases would then take up too 
much space in relation to their importance to this thesis. Just like with the non-referral 
examples, the examples of member state observation are included to illustrate the concept as 
such, and not to be used for drawing quantitative conclusions. Choosing other cases as examples 
could have resulted in a different illustration. The cases chosen does however include two 
examples of when the CJEU does not rule in line with the favoured view of the member states, 
and one case where it partly rules in line with the member states’ observation’, which conforms 
to the statistics in the cited studies. 
The Defrenne II case was chosen for the above stated reasons, but also because there is a value 
in showing an important case where the Court, seemingly, to a slight extent ruled in favour of 
the member state observations. This, as have been stressed above, because the examples are 
used as illustrative examples, and not as quantitatively representable. 
Concerning the principle of supremacy, the Ciola case was chosen due to it having observations 
from a member state that clearly contested the supremacy doctrine, and it was easy to follow 
the argumentation from both the member state and the CJEU. Even though it is not one of the 
major supremacy cases, like Costa,74 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft,75 or Simmenthal,76 it 
is still a hugely important case where the Court called for the principle of supremacy to be 
                                                 
73 Naurin, D., et al, ‘Coding observations of the Member States and judgments of the Court of Justice of the EU 
under the preliminary reference procedure 1997-2008’ (2013) 1 CERGU’s working paper series. 
74 Case C-6/64 Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L., supra note 51. 
75 Case C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, supra note 53. 
76 Case C-106/77 Simmenthal, supra note 53. 
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required in all cases where a directly effective EU law is concerned.77 The Court has, however, 
qualified its reasoning in Ciola to a slight extent in later case law,78 demonstrating that the 
CJEU case law is a living instrument. 
 
1.5. Terminology, or the meaning of words 
In the thesis, when talking about principles, that equates to legal principles. Legal principles are 
defined, by the free dictionary, as “principle[s] underlying the formulation of jurisprudence”.79  
The term European Community, instead of European Union, will be used in quotes when that 
phrase is present, and when referring to the years when the EU was labelled a Community. 
In this thesis the method of legal interpretivism is used. The most renowned scholar in this 
theory is Dworkin. There are opinions, though, that Dworkin’s theories should rather be 
classified as critical legal positivism.80 It is not the task of this thesis to make an assessment of 
that claim. The term legal interpretivism will be used, without taking a stand in this debate. 
In this thesis, no distinction is made between the principles of supremacy and primacy.81 
 
1.6. Disposition, or how to arrange a thesis 
The second section will provide a theoretical context, focusing on the legal interpretivist and 
legal positivist theories. They will be analysed in relation to their notion of principles; the 
definition of principles, the possible creation of principles, and the development of principles 
in relation to democracy. Also, the second section will provide with a description on the use of 
principles, with a directed focus at the CJEU. The third section consists of a scrutiny of member 
states’ possible influence concerning the two tools available through the preliminary ruling 
procedure – nonreferral and the submission of observations. To exemplify, both tools will be 
examined from the perspective of the principles of direct effect and supremacy. The fourth 
section will provide with a sort of ”connect the dots” perspective, where the legal certainty and 
                                                 
77 Craig, P., de Búrca, G., EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, supra note 13, p. 269. 
78 Case C-453/00 Kühne & Heitz (2004) ECLI:EU:C:2004:17; Case C-2/06 Kempter (2008) ECLI:EU:C:2008:78. 
79 The Free Dictionary by Farlex, ‘legal principle’, last updated 2012, retrieved 2 November 2017, available at 
https://www.thefreedictionary.com/legal+principle. 
80 See e.g. Tuori, K., Critical Legal Positivism, supra note 25. 
81 On the difference between supremacy and primacy see e.g. Avbelj, M., ‘Supremacy or Primacy of EU Law—
(Why) Does It Matter?’ (2011) 17:6 European Law Journal, 744. 
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democracy perspectives, from the two theories’ in section two’s point of view, will be applied 
to the member state tools from the third section. The fifth section will consist of some 
concluding remarks and, lastly, the sixth section will provide a tentative suggestion of how to 
further develop this research.  
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2. Legal positivism and interpretivism – introducing theories 
Even though the heading of this section vaguely states that the two theories of legal 
interpretivism and legal positivism shall be introduced, this has been done under section 1.4.2. 
Here, the theories are going to be introduced and examined in relation to principles, their take 
on what principles are and how they are formed. The results will then be applied to the 
development of principles in the CJEU. There will also be an assessment of the use of principles 
in relation to how the CJEU uses them. Lastly, an examination on how legal interpretivists and 
legal positivists define democracy in relation to the development of principles, and whether or 
not the development of principles by the CJEU adheres to those definitions, will be provided. 
 
2.1. Principles versus rules 
As previously stated, principles are used as a ground of interpretation for judges in both national 
and international courts. In practice, principles thus play a significant role in the judicial 
domain. 
There are numerous principles at work in the legal sphere. According to Dworkin, a principle 
is “a standard that is to be observed, not because it will advance or secure an economic, political, 
or social situation deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or 
some other dimension of morality.”82 Principles are hence used as a source of law, and they 
have shown to, at times, have the power to trump legislation in judgments.83 To better 
understand why that is, one needs to examine the concept of principles. In order for a description 
to be valuable, it needs to be presented in a context. For principles that would be the comparison 
to rules. This because the legal norms are made up by the two. An examination of the two 
principles, direct effect and supremacy, and whether or not they actually are principles will also 
be provided. 
 
2.1.1. Legal interpretivism 
It is quite impossible, and almost erroneous, to talk about principles and their distinction without 
mentioning Dworkin. Dworkin, as a legal interpretivist, has a very clear idea of the concept of 
                                                 
82 Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 22. 
83 See e.g. Riggs v Palmer, supra note 4, and Henningsen v Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 
1960). 
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principles and the distinction between them and rules. Dworkin used the concept of principles 
primarily to criticise H. L. A. Hart and the legal positivism in relation to Hart’s “rule of 
recognition”. Dworkin’s critique, however, provided with his understanding of principles and 
their notion.  
To begin with, it is clear to Dworkin that principles are part of the law and are to be considered 
a source of law.84 Considering the distinction between principles and rules, Dworkin claims, it 
is to be seen as logic.85 Rules and principles differ in both “character of the direction they 
give”86 and in the way they are formulated.87 There are, according to Dworkin, two main 
differences between principles and rules. First, rules are applicable in a hard-line inflexible way; 
they either apply and are valid or they do not and are to be considered invalid.88 Also, if one 
does not follow a rule, there are often consequences.89 Principles, on the other hand, do not have 
this inflexible attribute.90 Alexy, who has emanated on Dworkin’s opinions in this matter, shares 
his main points that there is a clear difference between principles and rules. Considering 
Dworkins first difference Alexy, however, explains it with an optimization thesis. To Alexy, 
rules, which do apply in an all-or-nothing fashion,91 are “definitive commands”.92 Principles, 
which rather are always applicable, if they affect the situation at hand, are instead fulfilled in 
different degrees, and therefore considered “optimization commands”.93  
                                                 
84 Dworkin, R., ‘The Model of Rules’, supra note 27. 
85 Ibid., p. 25.  
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid., p. 26. 
88 Dworkin explains them as “applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion”; Ibid., p. 25. This opinion is shared by 
Alexander; Alexander, L., ‘Legal Objectivity and the Illusion of Legal Principles’ in Klatt (ed.) Institutionalized 
Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (The United States, Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 117. 
89 An example that Dworkin mentions is if a will is not witnessed by three people, and that is the rule, the will is 
invalid; Dworkin, R., ‘The Model of Rules’, supra note 27, p. 25. 
90 An example that Dworkin mentions is that even though the principle “no man may profit from his own wrong” 
exists, there are situations where that happens and are “legal”. Dworkin describes, for instance, that if a person 
trespasses on someone else’s land for a “sufficient period of time”, the person will then gain the right to cross the 
land whenever he or she pleases; Ibid., p. 25. 
91 Alexy refers to them as applicable in an “alles-oder-nichts” sense; Avila, H., Theory of Legal Principles, supra 
note 65, p. 10, referring to Alexy, R., Theorie der Grundrechte (2nd ed., Frankfurt am Main, Surkamp Verlag, 
1994), p. 80, 83, Alexy, R., ‘Zum bergriff des Reichtsprinzips’ in von Werner, K., Opalek, K., Peczenik, A., 
Argumentation und Hermeneutik in der Jurisprudenz (Berlin, Duncker und Humblot, 1979), p. 70. 
92 Alexy, R., ‘On the Structure of Legal Principles’, supra note 67, p. 295. 
93 Ibid, p. 295; Avila, H., Theory of Legal Principles, supra note 65, p. 9-10, referring to Alexy, R., ‘Zum bergriff 
des Reichtsprinzips’, supra note 91, p.59ff, Alexy, R., ‘Rechtsregeln und Reichtsprinzipien’ (1985) Archives 
Rechts und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft, 25, p. 19ff, Alexy, R., ‘Rechtssystem und praktische Vernunft’ in Alexy, 
R., Recht, Vernunft, Discus (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1995), p. 216-217, Alexy, R., Theorie der 
Grundrechte, supra note 91, p. 77ff. 
19 
 
Second, Dworkin argues, principles have a dimension of weight that rules lack.94 Should two 
principles intersect, the conflict is resolved by weighing the principles against each other.95 In 
a conflict between e.g. consumer protection and the freedom of contracts, the court will find 
one of the principles to be of more weight and thus that it prevails. Alexy, however, has a 
slightly different take on the dimension of weight. When principles collide, Alexy argues, one 
principle is not found to take precedence over the other as such, and therefore found to always 
have more weight than the other, but rather that one principle takes precedence in the specific 
case at hand due to the distinguishing circumstances.96 This means that principles are only 
realized, and valued in relation to their weight, when they are applied in an actual case before 
a court. 97 
Dworkin, thus, explains the difference between principles and rules foremost in relation to the 
“all-or-nothing” aspect and the dimension (or lack of) weight. Even though Alexy agrees with 
these specific differences, the distinction between principles and rules, he argues, should rather 
be derived from their differences concerning collision-situations98 and the different obligations 
they entail.99 This means that principles and rules have different properties and qualities. Rules 
establish a definite standard and are applied by connection, while principles are applied by 
weighing, and a conflict between rules is “abstract […], necessary […], and located on the plane 
of validity”100 whereas conflicts between principles are “concrete […], contingent […] and 
located on a plane of efficacy”.101 
Peczenik and Aarnio, legal theorists who are also considered to be legal interpretivists, have 
also expressed their opinions concerning the distinction of principles. In addition to the 
aforementioned differences, Peczenik and Aarnio add another difference. In their opinion, 
                                                 
94 Dworkin, R., ‘The Model of Rules’, supra note 27, p. 27. 
95 Ibid., p. 26. 
96 Avila, H., Theory of Legal Principles, supra note 65, p. 10, referring to Alexy, R., ‘Rechtsregeln und 
Reichtsprinzipien’, supra note 93, p. 17. 
97 Ibid., referring to Alexy, R., ‘Rechtsregeln und Reichtsprinzipien’, supra note 93, p. 18. 
98 In a collision between rules, one is declared invalid or an exception is created. In a collision between principles, 
one principle is found of more weight in the specific case at hand. Both principles, though, stay “valid”; Avila, H., 
Theory of Legal Principles, supra note 65, p. 10, referring to Alexy, R., ‘Rechtsregeln und Reichtsprinzipien’, 
supra note 93, p. 20. 
99 Rules are considered to entail absolute obligations, while principles entail prima facie obligations making them 
in risk of being overcome or pre-empted by other colliding principles; Avila, H., Theory of Legal Principles, supra 
note 65, p. 10, referring to Alexy “Rechtsregeln und Reichtsprinzipien”, Archives Rechts und Sozialphilosophie, 
Beiheft 25, 1985 Alexy, R., ‘Rechtsregeln und Reichtsprinzipien’, supra note 93, p. 20. 
100 Avila, H., Theory of Legal Principles, supra note 65, p. 47. 
101 Ibid. 
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principles express a specific value while rules contain an arrangement of many different 
values.102 
To conclude, Dworkin and the other legal interpretivists consider the distinction between 
principles and rules clear and evident. That is, however, not the case for Hart and legal 
positivists. 
 
2.1.2. Legal positivism 
Although Hart himself did not address principles in his “The concept of law”, he briefly 
addressed it, due to the direct critique from Dworkin, in the postscript to the second edition. His 
view is therefore a direct answer to Dworkin, which is why he does not discuss every aspect 
concerning principles.  
Hart contests that there would be a logical distinction between principles and rules. Raz, a pupil 
of Hart, expressed that suggesting there is a logical distinction between the two should be 
“greeted with some suspicion”.103 
To Hart, there are two characteristics that separate principles from rules. He, however, 
emphasizes that these differences are a matter of degree, it is not a clear cut either-or as Dworkin 
claims. The first difference is that principles, in general, are broad, unspecific and imprecise.104 
In contrast to what Peczenik and Aarnio holds, Hart claims that “often what would be regarded 
as a number of distinct rules can be exhibited as the exemplifications or instantiations of a single 
principle”.105 The second characteristic that distinguishes principles from rules, according to 
Hart, is that principles, more than rules, pursue a specific goal or value, and, because of this, 
are considered desirable to uphold.106 This makes principles not only a provider of an 
explanation to the rules, but also something that contributes to their justification. Rules are 
instead often, but not always, described in sentences containing normative expressions like 
“should”, “must” or “ought to” – or indeed their antonyms.107  
                                                 
102 Peczenik, A., On Law and Reason (2nd ed., Dordrecht, Springer Science Business Media B.V, 2008), p. 66. 
103 Raz, J., ‘Legal Principles and the Limits of Law’, supra note 68, p. 838. 
104 Hart, H. L. A., The concept of law, 3rd ed., supra note 28, p. 260. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid., p. 10. 
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The main differences between principles and rules, according to Hart, are hence their breadth 
and desirability. He also addresses Dworkin’s opinion of rules being applicable in an all-or-
nothing fashion, and principles, lacking that attribute, having a “non-conclusive” character.108 
Hart instead holds that the distinction between “all-or-nothing” rules and “non-conclusive” 
principles does not always exist, and that, as has already been mentioned, principles and rules 
should be seen as part of the same norm-scale where the differences are a matter of degree.109 
Raz expands on Harts theories. He explains that principles can be used to justify rules, but not 
vice versa.110 He agrees with the seemingly common view in legal positivism, that there can be 
no clear distinction between principles and rules as such; as Raz writes, “not everything which 
looks like a legal principle is a legal principle”.111 On this division, Raz also uses Dworkin’s 
own arguments to show that Dworkin lacks consistency and logic, and that the distinction 
between principles and rules therefore is to be seen as illusory.112 
Wiklund and Bengoetxea also shares Hart’s and Raz’s opinion concerning the differentiation. 
In their “General Constitutional Principles of Community Law” they do however differentiate 
between principles and rules “[for] the purpose of this work”.113 Principles are, according to 
them, generally found to underlie rules and explain the reason for the rule’s existence.114 Even 
though they do stress that there are rules that can look like principles, they have identified seven 
senses of expression for identifying a (legal) principle. Principles are norms or provisions with 
a high degree of generality, that are vague or with a high degree of vagueness, of a 
programmatic nature that addresses the legislator, that rank high in the hierarchy of sources, 
that are of a fundamental importance in the legal system, that are considered meta-norms, and 
that are found through a comparison of different legal systems.115 That said, a principle does 
                                                 
108 Hart, H. L. A., The concept of law, 3rd ed., supra note 28, p. 261. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Raz, J., ‘Legal Principles and the Limits of Law’, supra note 68, p. 839. 
111 Ibid., p. 828. 
112 “Since principles apply to cases which are regulated by contrary rules, on cannot observe that words like 
‘reasonable’ and ‘unjust’ make ‘the application of the rule which contains [them] depend to some extent upon 
principles … and in this way makes that rule itself more like a principle’ and then argue that it is nevertheless only 
a rule because each of ‘these terms restricts the kind of other principles on which the rule depends’.”; Raz, J., 
‘Legal Principles and the Limits of Law’, supra note 68, p. 837 making references to Dworkin “The model of 
rules” Dworkin, R., ‘The Model of Rules’, supra note 27, p. 28-29. 
113 Wiklund, O., Bengoetxea, J., ‘General Constitutional Principles of Community Law’ in Bernitz, U., Nergelius, 
J., (eds.), and Swedish Network for European Legal Studies the Faculty of Law, University of Lund, General 
Principles of European Community Law: Reports from a Conference in Malmö, 27-28 August 1999 (The Hague, 
Kluwer, 2000), p 121. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid., p 124. 
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not have to fulfil all these seven criteria in order to be classified as a principle. Inversely, there 
are certainly rules that fulfil one or more of these criteria and still are classified as rules. 
All in all, the common standpoint for legal positivists, Hart being the frontrunner, is to not make 
a clear distinction between principles and rules, but rather see them as part of the same norm-
concept. 
 
2.1.3. Direct effect and supremacy 
Direct effect and supremacy are referred to as principles by both scholars116 and EU 
institutions.117 The CJEU has consistently used direct effect and supremacy as principles, 
seemingly without much concern of the theoretical value. Should they, however, be classified 
as principles? 
The question of “branding” might seem unimportant. It is of interest though since principles 
have a greater influence than rules, due to them affecting many legal areas and not just one 
subject. Also, in order to deal with them correctly it is important to know what applies. It is, 
furthermore, important to acknowledge that several actors, like the CJEU, might have their own 
agenda when applying a norm as a principle.118 Since the word principle automatically attributes 
certain characteristics119 to the norm,120 there could, therefore, be in the CJEU’s interest to use 
that label even if the norm does not fulfil the criteria of principles. 
Direct effect and supremacy are not applied in an all-or-nothing fashion, they are always 
applicable, like principles. However, they more resemble norms that fulfil the “definitive 
commands” and are to be fulfilled to a full extent rather than to a certain degree. They are 
specific in the sense that they clearly state how a situation where they apply should be 
interpreted, like rules. Also, like rules, they seem to lack weight. Direct effect and supremacy 
are, however, desirable for the Union to uphold, like principles. Even though that is, they do 
                                                 
116 See e.g. Wiklund, O., Bengoetxea, J., ‘General Constitutional Principles of Community Law’, supra note 108, 
Groussot, X., Creation, Development and Impact of the General Principles of Community Law: Towards a Jus 
Commune Europaeum?, supra note 7, Tridimas, T., The General Principles of EU Law, supra note 7. 
117 See e.g. Eurlex, ‘Direct effect of European law’, 14 January 2015, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Al14547. 
118 ”Sometimes, however, the ECJ oversimplifies things: by merely characterising a provision as a principle it 
occasionally attempts to justify its wide interpretation and the narrow interpretation of a contradictory norm.”; von 
Bogdandy, A., Bast, J., Principles of European Constitutional Law, supra note 1, p. 17. 
119 E.g. principles being more applicable and thusly easier to conform; see Avila, H., Theory of Legal Principles, 
supra note 65, p. 47. 
120 von Bogdandy, A., ‘Founding Principles of EU Law: A Theoretical and Doctrinal Sketch’ (2010) 16:2 European 
Law Journal, 95, p. 104. 
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seem to consist of more than one value; a principle might be to uphold the effectivity of EU 
law, the rule then being direct effect. Concerning the seven tell-tales, direct effect and 
supremacy fulfils three; they are ranked high in the EU legal order – they are part of EU primary 
law, they are fundamentally important – that has been firmly established by several scholars 
and by the CJEU itself, and they are meta-norms – they are applied “on top of” any case or 
situation, unlike more subject-bound rules. 
These observations points in both directions. Direct effect and supremacy have some 
characteristics that principles have, and some that are consistent with rules. They do, however, 
span over the entire aquis and, as has been mentioned, affect more than just one area of law. 
Also, as Hart writes, the distinction between rules and principles might not be as sharp as 
Dworkin and Alexy propose – not all norms will fulfil all criteria of either principles or rules. 
It furthermore cannot be completely overlooked that the two norms always have been referred 
to as principles by the EU institutions and by scholars. 
The logic conclusion would therefore be that direct effect and supremacy, even though they do 
not have all characteristics, should be, and rightfully are, classified as principles. 
 
2.2. The roles of principles 
As has been demonstrated, the definition of principles is a debateable question on which 
scholars disagree. What is not as unclear is how principles are used and what role they have. A 
review on this, aiming the attention at the CJEU’s use of principles, will thus be provided. This 
review is rather relevant to have here so that one can keep it in mind when later reading the 
discussion on how the principles are (or are not) created. 
The role of principles has been established by many scholars. The general view seems to be 
quite consonant, why no division between e.g. the two theories will be applied here. Alexander 
and Kress, for example, describe principles as “the theoretical entities that justify the legal rules, 
determine how they should be extended and modified, and resolve conflicts among them.”121 
“[P]rinciples”, they continue, “ultimately determine all legal decisions, even those clearly 
covered by non-conflicting rules, since the decision to apply the rules rather than overrule or 
modify them is itself a product of the legal principles.”122 This application and citation of 
                                                 
121 Alexander, L., Kress, K., ‘Against Legal Principles’ (1997) 82 Iowa Law Review, 739, p. 748. 
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principles as a justification to adopt, or apply, rules, is shared by, amongst others, Dworkin.123 
Dworkin further explains that, in courts, principles play an essential part for arguments that 
support rulings concerning a specific right or obligation, using Riggs v Palmer124 and 
Henningsen125 as examples.126 
Raz has also commented on the role of principles. According to him, they can be used in five 
different ways.127 They can be grounds for interpreting laws, changing laws, be grounds for 
particular exceptions to laws, grounds for making new rules, and as the sole ground for action 
in particular cases.128  
When principles are used to interpret law, the most common and least constrained form of 
use,129 they are not limited to a specific type of legislation. As Raz describes, some 
interpretations are obviously found to be more conform and in line with a principle, the 
preferred interpretation is however up to the court. This use of principles is therefore extremely 
important since it, when used “correctly”, fosters a coherence within the legal system.130 
Principles can also be used for changing subordinate legislation.131 This use is closely 
intertwined with the first one, since it sometimes can be hard to distinguish between an 
interpretation and a change.  
The third use is to use principles as grounds for particular exceptions to law. This means that 
in certain cases where applying a specific law, which would in fact be applicable, would lead 
to a sacrifice of important principles worth protecting, that law can be exempt.132 This, notably, 
does not mean that the law is modified or amended, but that it in the specific case was to be 
exempt. 
                                                 
123 Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 82, p. 28. 
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126 Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 82, p. 28. 
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Principles can also be ground for establishing new rules. This use is very important with regards 
to how the common law is developed.133 When there are principles applicable to a certain range 
of issues, but no law, courts themselves regulate that specific area by establishing new rules.134 
The last use for principles, according to Raz, is to use them as the sole ground for making new 
rules. This resembles the previous situation, but there are significant differences. When 
principles are the sole ground for making new rules, they “do not operate through the mediation 
of rules”.135 In certain situations, for example the area of sentencing, or the activities of official 
agencies, the entire area is (almost) exclusively governed by principles.136 
 
2.2.1. How are principles being used by the CJEU 
It is clear to see that principles can be used in several different ways, with a various degree of 
judicial impact. It is, though, not by default so that all courts use principles in all possible ways. 
There are, for instance, differences between courts in common law and civil law systems, 
concerning the use of principles.137 The focus will however be directed towards the CJEU and 
its specific use of principles.  
 
History and development 
The CJEU has used principles in their judgments since the earliest Community years, the first 
example being non-discrimination and proportionality, which can be found in case law from 
the 1950s.138 The Court started developing principles themselves through the Algera case139 in 
1957, where the principle of legitimate expectations was founded.140 When establishing 
principles the Court uses comparative research, administered by the Advocate Generals, to find 
legal principles within the national legal systems.141 National legal traditions thus play an 
essential role in the development of principles, however, it is not the only source for 
                                                 
133 Raz, J., ‘Legal Principles and the Limits of Law’, supra note 68, p. 841. 
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138 Tridimas, T., The General Principles of EU Law, supra note 7, p. 7. 
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interpretation that the CJEU uses and not all national legal traditions are consistent with each 
other.142 Also, some member states’ legal traditions are more often sources for inspiration, and 
therefore more influential, than other member states’.143  
General principles in the EU has been described by Tridimas as enfants terribles, in the sense 
that they are “children of national law but, as brought up by the Court they become […] 
extended, narrowed, restated, transformed by a creative and eclectic judicial process.”144 With 
that in mind, these terrible children of law do play an important role in the CJEU, and affect 
cases before the Court in significant ways. They mainly serve three purposes for the Court; as 
grounds for interpretation, for fulling up legal lacunae and for reviewing legislation.145 
 
Used as grounds for interpretation 
Just as Raz describes the use of principles as grounds for interpretation, so does Lenaerts and 
Gutiérrez-Fonts in the specific arena of the CJEU and the Union. There are, however, 
limitations to when principles can serve as the ground for interpretation. They can only be used 
as such in cases which fall within their scope of application.146 Also, worth mentioning even 
though it does not concern the CJEU but rather the Union, in proceedings before national courts 
where the courts refer to EU principles, using the principles as an interpretation of national law 
contra legem is precluded.147  
The CJEU has stated in several judgements that when an EU provision is open to more than 
one interpretation, preference should be given to the interpretation which renders the provision 
                                                 
142 A clear example of when national legal traditions differed was when the Court established the principle of non-
discrimination in relation to age in the Mangold case, which could not be derived from all member states legal 
traditions; Case C-144/04 Mangold (2005) ECLI:EU:C:2005:709; Craig, P., de Búrca, G., EU Law: Text, Cases, 
and Materials, supra note 13, p. 932-34. 
143 It is established that the French and German legal traditions have been great sources for inspiration and that 
English law, for example, have had less influence. It should though be noted that the two first Advocate Generals 
were from France and Germany respectively; Tridimas, T., The General Principles of EU Law, supra note 7, p. 
24-25. 
144 Ibid., p. 6. 
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consistent with the general principles.148 The Court has thusly also voiced the principles’ 
function as grounds for interpretation.  
As is more evident under the next heading, the CJEU uses principles to foster harmonization 
and thus make sure that all legislation is interpreted in the same way, through i.e. using them as 
grounds for interpretation of Union provisions.149 
 
Used for filling up legal lacunae 
When EU legislation is left with gaps, principles can be used for filling those lacunae. This 
function is seemingly the most acknowledged for principles within the EU.150 The EU Treaties 
have been described as incomplete contracts,151 with scholars referring to them as something 
that at times resembles a swiss cheese, or maybe rather like Rauschenberg’s white paintings152 
– frames with no substantial content. The need for filling up the legal lacuna has therefore surely 
been vital. 
The gap-filling serves several functions. First, it ensures the avoidance of a déni de justice.153 
This function was recognised by the Court in the Algera case.154 To use principles to avoid 
risking a denial of justice is also in line with member state legal traditions.155 Second, as has 
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already been mentioned under the previous heading, using principles as gap-fillers helps 
ensuring a harmonious interpretation of EU provisions and a coherence of the EU legal order.156 
This function of principles is by no means unique for the EU or CJEU, but commonly found in 
other courts.157  
However, as claimed by Koopmans, “[t]he general principles are not, or not any more, used to 
patch gaps left between legal provisions duly enacted by the framers of laws, constitutions or 
Treaties. On the contrary, they are an integral part of the conceptual tools judges employ 
nowadays for settling disputes.”158 This view is, and has been, contested by many scholars, for 
example Groussot.159 Even though principles were used as gap-fillers more frequently in the 
early Union years, they still fill this function.160 
 
Used as a ground for review 
The third main use for principles in the CJEU is to use them as a ground for reviewing secondary 
legislation, and the compatibility of national law, falling within the scope of EU law, with Union 
provisions.161 This review-function of the Court is expressed in the Treaties.162   
Any Union measure that is found by the CJEU to infringe a general principle is annulled by the 
Court.163 The Court has expressed this role of principles in several cases, for instance in 
Cinéthèque,164 Demirel,165 and ERT.166  
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2.2.2. Usage of direct effect and supremacy  
The principles of direct effect and supremacy were primarily established as a way to fill up 
legal lacunae.167 Direct effect was created by the CJEU to establish a right, for individuals 
within the Union, that did not exist before, i.e. a gap in the Court’s mind.168 The principle of 
supremacy was created to ensure said right. Since established, however, the principles have 
rather been used as a ground for interpretation and review of EU legislation.169 When national 
courts, for instance, refer questions to the CJEU for preliminary rulings, they often refer to the 
principles considering how a EU provision should be interpreted.170 This change in use has also 
been emphasized by Koopmans.171 Nevertheless, the principle of direct effect has been 
developed over decades, and every large development, e.g. creating direct horizontal effect or 
indirect effect, can be seen as filling new gaps found by the Court.  
Reconnecting to subsection 2.1.3, the function that direct effect and supremacy have, i.e. 
created as gap-fillers and grounds for interpretation and review, also supports the conclusion 
that they are (theoretically) principles. 
 
2.3. The existence or creation of principles 
Following the discussion on what principles are and how they are used, the logical continuance 
would be to examine their existence or creation. Legal interpretivists and legal positivists have 
different opinions on the source of principles, and the possible discretion that courts have 
concerning them. 
 
2.3.1. Legal interpretivism 
Staying with Dworkin as the representative for legal interpretivism, it first has to be stated that, 
to him, the law does not contain gaps of which judges need to fill by creating norms. To claim 
that there are gaps is both misguiding and an expression of a superficial phenomenon, he 
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states.172  Instead judges use principles, that they find – not create, through cognising what is 
available within the system.173 Even in cases which are unclear,174 judges need to seek and find 
principles instead of creating them.175 The task of a court is, thus, to not invent new rights 
retrospectively when the case is presented to them, but discover what rights the parties do have 
under current judicial conditions.176 The way that judges then have discretion in unclear cases, 
to Dworkin, is to find the underlying legal principles that will yield a “right answer”177 and thus 
a correct ruling. 
What signifies Dworkin’s theory is hence that people have rights ex ante, i.e. before they have 
been acknowledged or upheld by a court.178 The court then simply adheres to them when they 
use them in their rulings. 
When applying this legal interpretivist view on development of principles, it is clear that the 
way that CJEU develops principles is in line with their way of “finding” principles. The CJEU, 
as has been described above, draws inspiration from member state legal traditions, the Treaties 
and other sources of legal grounds. The Court did this also when developing the principles of 
direct effect and supremacy. In van Gend,179 the Court referred to the objectives expressed in 
the preamble of the Treaties as stating that direct effect could be drawn from them, and thus 
something that already “existed”.180 In other words, the Court considers the EU legal order as 
a system that is complete, and that every legal question can be answered through the reliance 
on legal principles, that may not be written.181 It is therefore not illogical that Bengoetxea has 
claimed similarities between Dworkin’s approach to law and CJEU’s legal justification.182 The 
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Court has also been called Dworkian by several scholars, which might in this sense be rather 
suitable.183 
Legal interpretivists would, however, not agree with the Court’s expressed way of filling legal 
gaps. These two viewpoints do not have to be opposites. Because the CJEU considers the EU 
legal order to be a complete system, where principles can be found, that would mean that there 
are no real gaps. What appears to be a gap, due to e.g. the Treaties being traités cardres, is not 
an actual gap since principles, which do exist, cover those lacunae. In that sense, the CJEU’s 
method and pronounced use of principles is in line with the interpretivist understanding, and 
the Court could still keep its epithet of being Dworkian. 
 
2.3.2. Legal positivism 
For legal positivists like Hart, principles are created by judges due to their discretion in unclear 
cases. There are gaps in the law which courts have the right to fill. As Hart states, “there will 
always be certain unforeseen cases, unregulated by the law”.184 Judges should, in those 
situations, exercise their discretionary powers and create proper norms.185 To do so, judges need 
to apply the rule of recognition. The rule of recognition is to be seen as a social practice amongst 
officials, and entail judges to consider specified characteristics when they create norms. These 
characteristics can be to look at customs, precedents or even sources outside of the law, to draw 
inspiration when constructing norms.186 As long as judges follow this rule, they are “entitled to 
follow standards or reasons for decisions which are not dictated by the law and may differ from 
those followed by other judges faced with a similar [unclear] case.”187 To continue, for legal 
positivists, there is no such thing as rights ex ante. Norms exist when courts have established 
them, and not before.188 
The development of principles by the CJEU might be seen as legitimate creation by legal 
positivists, since, as the CJEU itself claims, the principles are developed to fill legal lacunae. 
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However, the CJEU rather states that they find principles and then use them to fill up lacunae, 
which rather insinuates that they consider the principles to already exist. The view that legal 
positivists have on the creation of principles is therefore more in line with how national courts 
work. 
 
2.4. Principles and democracy 
“Principles enable an autonomous legal discourse, strengthen the autonomy of courts 
vis-á-vis politics and allow for an internal development of the law which circumvents 
Article 48 EU. Is this acceptable in light of the principle of democracy?”189 
As Bast and von Bogdandy so candidly put it, there are some concerns regarding the CJEU’s 
creation of principles and the principle of democracy. As has been stated, direct effect and 
supremacy are principles, and also a part of the law. To create law is a task for the legislator. In 
the Union, the legislator, i.e. the Commission, the Parliament and the Council, are political 
bodies which EU nationals have the direct and indirect possibility to choose through democratic 
elections. This procedure has been transcribed in the Treaties by the member states, meaning 
that the design of it was intended. Member states and (indirectly) EU members were thus 
supposed to have the legislative power. When the CJEU then develops principles, it takes on a 
legislative role that it might not be supposed to have. As has been mentioned above, the CJEU 
has the power to fill gaps in the EU legislation. Would developing principles count as gap-
filling or simply a form of judicial activism creating judicial legislation? Or maybe rather, since 
this thesis is not going to cover the judicial activism-debate, is the development of principles, 
regardless whether it is gap-filling or judicial legislation, in line with the principle of 
democracy? 
The principle of democracy is transcribed in the preamble of the Treaties and is a value that the 
Union strongly advocates and adheres to.190 Legal interpretivists and legal positivists, however, 
have two different point of views on the concept of democracy. 
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2.4.1. Legal interpretivism 
Democracy from a legal interpretivist perspective191 can mostly be described as a strive for 
freedom. Dworkin describes two types of democracy, a majoritarian and a partnership view.192 
The majoritarian view is democracy governed by majority will. This does not ensure a fair 
result, since it might lead to unfair treatment of minority groups, where their rights and will 
might be overlooked.193 Dworkin, instead favour the other form of democracy, the partnership 
view. In that view the people governs themselves as a “full partner in a collective political 
enterprise”.194 The focal point, thus, is democracy for people as parts of a collective rather than 
people as a unity.  
This focus on individuals and rights is in line with how the CJEU has justified the creation of 
principles. When the Court developed the principle of direct effect, for instance, they did so 
with a reference to the rights of the EU members.195 This has also been the case when the Court 
has developed other principles.196 The development of principles by the CJEU can thusly be 
said to be in line with the legal interpretivist concept of democracy. 
 
2.4.2. Legal positivism 
If one looks at the older positivists’ view on democracy, the germane practice was habitual 
obedience by the majority of the population to the sovereign state.197 The desirable value was 
thus unity – one people, one voice. Because legal positivism, as a theory, makes a distinction 
between law and moral,198 and ensures a unity of the legal system by providing clear solution 
mechanisms for conflicts of law, it is by construction a close relative to the concept of 
sovereignty. Legal positivism has therefore been seen as related to the concept of the state, since 
it is through the sovereign state that the sovereignty of the people is realized, legal positivists 
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argue.199 Two examples that illustrate this state-focus are the concept of the Reichtsstaat and 
the Etat de droit législatif.200 In these concepts, the focus is not on sovereignty in relation to 
individuals but on sovereignty as an impersonal entity; a supreme juristic person or a nation.201 
This focus on unity can be compared with the majoritarian view on democracy that Dworkin 
describes. The focus on unity is thus a different take on democracy than the interpretivist view 
with its strive for freedom.  
The practice of the CJEU when establishing principles is not in direct line with the positivist 
unity-value. As has been established, the principles developed strengthen the individual rights 
for EU members, and thus do not ensure unity and stability for the state or entity. The 
development of the principles of direct effect and supremacy, and thus the creation of an 
autonomous legal system, would therefore be particularly troublesome for legal positivists 
concerning the compatibility with democracy, since it directly threatens the sovereign state.202 
 
2.5. Summary 
In this first section the possible differences between principles and rules have been established. 
To Dworkin and other legal interpretivists there is a clear distinction between the two. The main 
differences are that rules either apply or do not, while principles are not that inflexible. 
Principles have weight that rules on the other hand lack. Principles also tend to express one 
value, while rules consist of several. For Hart and legal positivists, this distinct differentiation 
between rules and principles is not appropriate since both principles and rules are part of the 
same norm-scale. Principles, however, tend to be used in a broader and more unprecise way. 
Also, what can be transcribed in several rules, can be put in one principle. Principles, 
furthermore, tend to pursue a specific goal and therefore are desirable to uphold. 
Concerning direct effect and supremacy, they have characteristics of both rules and principles. 
The fact that they span over the entire aquis, are meta-norms, are desirable to uphold and affect 
more than one area of the law, however, lead to a conclusion that they should be classified as 
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principles. The reference to them as principles by scholars and EU institutions are therefore 
theoretically correct. 
Principles have several roles in the judicial sphere. Alexander and Kress describe principles as 
justification for rules, a means to determine modifications to rules, and a means to resolve 
conflicts among rules. To Dworkin, principles are used to support the use of a specific right or 
obligation. Raz describes five main roles for principles. They can be grounds for interpreting 
laws, changing laws, be grounds for particular exceptions to laws, grounds for making new 
rules, and as the sole ground for action in particular cases.  
The CJEU has been described to have three main uses for principles. It uses them as grounds 
for interpretation of EU provisions. This function helps ensuring a uniform interpretation of 
norms and a harmonization within the EU legal order. The CJEU further uses principles as a 
means to fill up legal lacunae. With the EU Treaties being described as incomplete contracts, 
this use is plausibly the most acknowledged. Lastly, principles are used as a ground for review 
of secondary legislation, and the compatibility of national law, falling within the scope of EU 
law, with Union provisions. 
The principles of direct effect and supremacy, specifically, were established as a way to fill 
legal lacunae. Their development has, however, led to them more often being used as grounds 
for interpretation and for review. 
The legal interpretivists and legal positivist have different approaches to the existence or 
creation of principles. According to Dworkin and the legal interpretivists, principles always 
exist. When courts use them in their rulings, they find them within the existing system. There 
are no gaps in the law, the system is to be seen as complete. For legal positivists, like Hart, 
judges do create principles when there are no clear rules governing a specific situation, and they 
do have discretionary powers as long as they apply the rule of recognition.  
The CJEU’s development of principles is more in line with the legal interpretivist view. The 
Court is said to draw inspiration from e.g. national legal orders and therefore finding principles 
within the system. The fact that the Court uses principles to fill gaps can, however, be seen as 
in line with the legal positivist view. 
If one draws the attention to the principle of democracy, there are scholars that have some 
concerns regarding the CJEU’s creation of principles and the principle of democracy. Legal 
interpretivists and legal positivists have different views on how the concept of democracy is to 
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be understood. For legal interpretivists, democracy means a strive towards freedom, and the 
focus lies with people as parts of a collective rather than people as a unity. For legal positivists, 
democracy is instead to be understood as a strive towards habitual obedience by the majority 
of the population to the sovereign state, and thus a unity. The focus is not on sovereignty in 
relation to individuals but on sovereignty as an impersonal entity. 
The development of principles in the CJEU is in line with the strive for freedom, and therefore 
democratic in the legal interpretivist way. The sovereignty and unity focus that legal positivists 
have is more in line with a classic state rather than the EU system. 
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3. Non-referral and submitting observations – examining 
tools 
National courts’ main contact with the CJEU is through the preliminary ruling procedure. The 
procedure is regulated through article 267 TFEU. Courts may or shall ask questions about 
interpretation of EU provisions if they appear unclear.203 Should they appear clear, or have the 
provisions in question already been interpreted by the CJEU, national courts may refrain from 
posing a question to the CJEU. To refrain from referring a question for preliminary ruling is a 
tool used by national courts. 
In addition to the possibility to ask the CJEU for interpretation of EU provisions, the 
preliminary ruling procedure also gives member states the possibility to submit observations to 
the CJEU. When a national court has referred a question for preliminary ruling, any member 
state (including the member state of the referring court) may send their view to the CJEU on 
how the question should be answered. This is a tool used by member state governments. 
These two tools – to not send a question and to send observations – can both possibly be used 
to change the development of principles within the EU. The preliminary ruling procedure as 
such has been described by scholars as the main opportunity for CJEU to develop principles.204 
It was, for instance, through preliminary rulings that the principles of direct effect and 
supremacy were created and developed. 
An analysis of the two tools, in relation to the development of direct effect and supremacy, is 
therefore in order. 
 
3.1. Non-referral – hiding behind the acte clair doctrine 
3.1.1. Legal ground 
To refer a question to the CJEU is, as has already been stated, regulated through art 267 TFEU. 
National courts may refer questions if they are uncertain on the interpretation of the Treaties205 
or the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the 
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Union.206 National courts of last instance, whose decisions cannot be appealed, have the 
obligation to refer a question to the CJEU if such uncertainties appear in a case.207 This absolute 
obligation has exceptions, the most commonly used being the acte clair doctrine. 
 
3.1.2. The acte clair doctrine 
The concept of acte clair is described in the Oxford Dictionary of law as “[a] matter so obvious 
as not to need legal argument.”208 In judicial terms, that entails that a clear provision (acte clair) 
would not require interpretation, and thus would not need to be referred to the CJEU. The 
conditions for when national courts could refuse to refer a question with reference to the acte 
clair were established by the Court in CILFIT.209 
In CILFIT, the Court stated that national courts did not need to refer questions for preliminary 
rulings if they fulfilled certain criteria and restrictions: 
“Before it comes to the conclusion that such is the case [ie. the application of EU law 
being obvious], the national court or tribunal must be convinced that the matter is 
equally obvious to the courts of the other member states and to the court of justice. 
Only if those conditions are satisfied, may the national court or tribunal refrain from 
submitting the question to the court of justice and take upon itself the responsibility 
for resolving it. […] [T]he existence of such a possibility must be assessed on the basis 
of the characteristic features of community law and the particular difficulties to which 
its interpretation gives rise. To begin with, it must be borne in mind that community 
legislation is drafted in several languages and that the different language versions are 
all equally authentic. An interpretation of a provision of community law thus involves 
a comparison of the different language versions. […] Furthermore, it must be 
emphasized that legal concepts do not necessarily have the same meaning in 
community law and in the law of the various member states. Finally, every provision 
of community law must be placed in its context and interpreted in the light of the 
provisions of community law as a whole, regard being had to the objectives thereof 
and to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision in question is to be 
applied.”210 
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It thus takes a lot to fulfil the criteria of acte clair. However, not referring questions to the CJEU 
with reference to that doctrine, both right- and wrongfully, is a common and criticised 
phenomenon. 
 
3.1.3. Courts that did not ask 
When a national court does not refer a question for a preliminary ruling, the argument for why 
not would often be due to the interpretation of the provision in question being clear enough. 
This would however almost never be the case, at least in the view of Bebr. To him, for national 
courts to correctly interpret an EU provision would be “a happy coincidence bordering on a 
legal miracle.”211 He further criticises the acte clair doctrine, calling it an inherently flawed 
notion which “gravely threaten[s] an effective operation of the preliminary ruling procedure 
and so block the development of the Community legal order.”212 It has been claimed by other 
scholars as well that national courts use the acte clair doctrine as an improperly justification 
for not referring a question to the CJEU. 213 For some scholars, clarity is even impossible in 
theory.  
It is important to mention that several courts of last instance have been severely restrictive 
concerning asking the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. Under the 1970’s, for instance, the 
Bundesfinanzhof and the Conseil d’Etat was especially mentioned as courts unwilling to refer 
questions.214 It might not be the greatest mystery of all time as to why this is; courts of last 
instances will only risk losing their influence and authority when referring questions to the 
CJEU.215 Having said that, courts of last instances do not never pose questions to the CJEU. 
The questions, however, often seem to consider technical issues rather than questions of a more 
intrusive nature.216 To cite Alter, the courts seem to reserve the difficult questions for 
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themselves, applying a sort of “don’t ask and the ECJ can’t tell” policy.217 This reticence of 
national courts effectively limits the CJEU’s possibility to return to the national courts an 
“unfavourable” ruling, and thus limits the CJEU’s opportunity to develop principles.218 As 
Rasmussen puts it, “the more higher national courts take cover behind some questionable acte 
clair argument, the wider the scope of the concurrent jurisdictions become under article 
177(3)[now art 167(3) TFEU].”219 
 
Evaluating national courts 
It might be hard to evaluate the absence of matters referred to the CJEU by member states (how 
do you really prove a negative?!). One possibility would be to go through the case law from all 
the national courts to find cases where the questions concerned EU law and where the acte clair 
doctrine had been wrongfully relied upon. That would though be a task quite impossible to carry 
out, especially within the frames of this thesis. However, there are some examples already 
discovered that are worthy of mentioning here. 
In the case Syndicat des importateurs des vêtements220 from the French administrative court 
Conseil d’Etat, delivered in 1979, the matter concerned protective measures implemented by 
the French government. These measures introduced licenses for products already liberalized 
under article 113 EEC and covered by the multilateral arrangement regarding international trade 
in textiles, which in practice restricted their free movement. One of the issues raised by the 
plaintiff was whether or not the arrangement had direct effect, which indirect also concerned 
the question of supremacy.221 The Commisaire du gouvernement highly recommended the 
Conseil d’Etat to send a question for preliminary ruling to the CJEU on the matter.222 The 
Conseil d’Etat, however, declared the situation clear in relation to the acte clair doctrine and 
ruled against direct effect.223 This denial of direct effect, in a matter that had not been tried and 
clarified by the CJEU, and therefore obviously was not clear, could be an incorrect 
interpretation of Union law, and thus a wrongful use of the acte clair doctrine. In order for the 
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Court to develop the principle of direct effect, member states need to refer questions to it. For 
the Conseil d’Etat to not do that in such an unclear matter as the case seemed to be (at least 
according to the Commissaire du gouvernement), it affected the development, or lack thereof, 
of the principle.224 
Another example is a case before the German federal fiscal court, Bundesfinanzhof, delivered 
in 1981. The case concerned the effect of a provision in a directive that had been implemented 
after the time limit had expired,225 i.e. a question of direct effect. The question was raised in a 
lower court, but after appeal ended up in the Bundesfinanzhof. Instead of posing the question to 
the CJEU, the German court denied the provision direct effect with the explanation that Union 
law only had direct effect in national legal orders where powers had been transferred to the EU, 
and in this case, it had not.226 The Bundesfinanzhof also referred to rulings from the French 
Conseil d’Etat227 in order to justify its opinion.228 As a result, the Bundesfinanzhof denied any 
direct effect of a directive solely based on a matter of principles. Their ruling went against the 
case law of the CJEU,229 thereon touching upon another tool available for member states – the 
non-compliance. However, since there were discrepancies concerning the nature of directives 
and their effect, a referral in order for the CJEU to clarify would have been in order. Also, there 
was a disagreement amongst the scholars on whether or not the Court, at that time, had granted 
directives direct effect.230 Therefore, because the Bundesfinanzhof did not refer a question, the 
CJEU was deprived of their chance to develop the principle of direct effect and its effect in 
relation to directives. 
The interpretation of a directive, and thus its direct effect and supremacy, has been made in 
several other cases. An example north of the European continent is the Barsebäck case231 from 
the Swedish supreme administrative court, Regeringsrätten. The case concerned, amongst other 
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C-41/74 Van Duyn, supra note 71, case C-147/78 Ratti, supra note 71. 
230 See esp. CJEU judge Pescatore; Pescatore, P., ‘The doctrine of direct effect: an infant disease of community 
law’ (1983) 8 European Law Review, 155. 
231 RÅ 1999 ref 76 Barsebäck. 
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questions, the interpretation of a directive and the possible application of an exemption clause, 
i.e. if the directive should have direct effect and be supreme in the case before the court.232 The 
Regeringsrätten stated that several possible interpretations were plausible, and the court 
presented, for example, a teleological and a textual interpretational model that could result in 
different outcomes. The court therefore discussed whether a question should be referred to the 
CJEU. As is clear from the acte clair doctrine, if an EU provision is unclear, the national court 
should233 refer a question under art 267 TFEU. The Regeringsrätten, however, concluded that 
an interpretation of the directive would not be necessary or helpful in order to rule on the facts 
of the case. Worth noticing is that that conclusion was made after the court had in fact done an 
interpretation of the unclear direction, i.e. indirectly and, seemingly, wrongfully finding the 
directive clear enough. This case, and the non-referral, has been criticized by Swedish 
scholars.234 
 
3.1.4. Broken tool? 
How potent is then the usage of the tool of non-referral? First, as stated above, the principles of 
direct effect and supremacy have only been developed through the preliminary ruling 
procedure. If national courts did not send questions to the CJEU, the Court would not have any 
possibility to expand the sphere of the principles. This strongly suggests a great power entrusted 
to the national courts concerning what the CJEU can rule upon.  
There are examples of national courts not referring a question due to the matter being “clear”, 
when in fact the CJEU has established an opposite interpretation in earlier case law.235 This 
behaviour is though rather an example of non-compliance, or contained compliance, and 
therefore a different tool in the judicial tool box. It is however important to acknowledge that a 
non-referral can lead to a non-compliance scenario if the proper interpretation is settled by the 
CJEU, but the national court uphold their original interpretation. There is another risk with the 
use of non-referral. When member state courts do not refer and instead do their own 
interpretations of EU provisions they ensure a non-consistency and an incohesive interpretation 
                                                 
232 RÅ 1999 ref 76 Barsebäck, section 5.3.3. 
233 The Reringsrätten is a court of last instance. 
234 See e.g. Bernitz, U., ’Barsebäckdomen i Regeringsrätten – borde förhandsavgörande av EG-domstolen ha 
begärts?’ (199/2000) 4 Juridisk Tidskrift, 964; Nergelius, J., De Europeiska Domstolarna Och Det Svenska 
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and application of EU provisions throughout the Union. This will, as with the non-compliance, 
result in a difference in jurisprudence for individuals depending on what member state one may 
live in. And to what gain? Non-referral, when used incorrectly, can thus be seen as a sort of 
(civil) disobedience. Through a constructive ambiguity, national courts create an advantage for 
themselves in relation to the CJEU at the expense of the EU members. A follow up question 
would therefore be, should non-referral through a (mis)use of acte clair be discarded?236 
If interpretation of EU law was completely left to the CJEU, as it somewhat is supposed to be, 
that would definitely ensure a coherence and a uniform application of EU law in the entire 
Union. In practice, however, there might be hard to discard the acte clair doctrine because, if 
applied correctly, it rightfully limits the work load for the CJEU since it is supposed to cover 
matters that have already been clarified. Also, as has been stressed by de la Mare and Donnely, 
the possible lack of uniformity might be preferable to “diluting or degrading the manner in 
which the case is handled, or by increasing the damage caused by delay”.237 It is by no means 
without possible damages to refer questions to the CJEU, especially concerning the delay of the 
case before the national court.238 To risk lack of coherence might therefore, to some extent, be 
favourable than the removal of acte clair and the non-referral tool. To refer back to the second 
section and Dworkin and Alexy, in this conflict between the principles of coherence and 
member state autonomy, maybe the former has less weight in this situation. 
There is, also, a rather grave flaw with the impact of the non-referral tool. If one examines the 
case from the German Bundesfinanzhof mentioned above, the effects of that ruling – i.e. not 
giving the CJEU the possibility to develop the principle of direct effect – were completely 
overturned when a German court of lower instance referred a question to the CJEU on the same 
matter.239 It consequently only takes one question from any national court for the power of 
interpretation to end up at the CJEU. Higher courts, who might not want to give the CJEU the 
                                                 
236 On the development of the acte clair doctrine, see e.g. Limante, A., ‘Recent Developments in the Acte Clair 
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238 See e.g. the O’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur case from the United Kingdom, where the court expressed that the need 
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been trying for over even years to litigate the question of whether he is entitled to any compensation”; [2008] 
UKHL 34 O’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur. 
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chance at expanding the principles, can misuse and hide behind the acte clair doctrine all they 
want then, it does not seem to matter in the end. 
Lower courts do have several incentives for referring questions to the CJEU, thus “risking” 
undoing the non-referral from higher courts. First, being a court of a lower instance, they do 
not have the same “pride” that higher courts seemingly have.240 They are used to having a higher 
instance rewrite and correct their jurisprudence. They also would not have to reflect and worry 
upon how their actions might affect the legal certainty, or the functioning of the national legal 
system.241 Through referring a question to the CJEU, lower courts would also be allowed to 
circumvent restrictive jurisprudence created by higher courts, and have the opportunity to push 
issues on to the agenda that higher courts do not want to reopen.242 To have a decision from the 
CJEU behind their judgements also significantly lowers the risk for the lower courts of getting 
their rulings overturned by a higher court, which, in turn strengthens the power and influence 
of the lower courts.243 One humorous observation that Alter made from this is that lower courts 
have been using the CJEU as the “other parent” – the one to turn to if they suspect an undesirable 
answer from the first parent, the national higher court.244 
What is apparent, however, is that lower courts have several strong incentives for referring a 
question to the CJEU when they deem it necessary. It is not remarkable then to find that they 
have been more open to send broad and, sometimes, provocative questions to the CJEU 
concerning the reach of EU law in the national legal order, i.e. questions concerning, for 
instance, direct effect and supremacy.245  
A problem thus arises for national courts of last instance. It only takes one referral from any 
court for the higher courts to be bound by CJEU case law in comparable situations. 
Disturbingly, there are examples of when higher courts have been trying to prevent lower courts 
from referring questions to the CJEU. In the United Kingdom, the court of appeal along with 
the House of Lords developed strict and narrow guidelines for when lower courts had the 
justifiable right to refer a question to the CJEU.246 There are other examples where higher courts 
have declared a narrow interpretation of EU legislation, in order to limit lower courts’ space for 
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referring questions.247 In extreme cases, higher courts have even quashed decisions from lower 
courts to refer questions to the CJEU, or even gone as far as to directly challenge the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU.248 These actions from higher courts, however, do not seem to have 
the greatest impact, since lower courts have been found to ignore the commands given to 
them.249 
All in all, the non-referral tool seems to be both weak and not as potent as the national (higher) 
courts might want.  
 
3.2. Submit observations to the CJEU 
3.2.1. Legal ground 
The right to send submissions or observations to the Court is transcribed in art 23 of the Courts 
statute, which is annexed to the Treaties.250 This is a possibility for member states to thoroughly 
argue their favoured interpretation of the Union law. That, in turn, gives the Court a greater 
understanding on how different interpretations would play in the member states.251 The order 
for reference, sent to the CJEU from the referring court, is disclosed to all member states, they 
can thus send their proposal of interpretations, i.e. their observations, to the CJEU before the 
Court rules on the matter.252 This tool is therefore, seemingly, rather favourable for the member 
states.  
 
3.2.2. The outcome of the use of the tool 
The intended consequence when member states submit their observations is, as has been stated, 
to influence the EU law interpretation of the CJEU. Since the possible outcomes of the 
interpretation could be a loss of member state’s sovereignty,253 the outcome of one case before 
                                                 
247 See e.g. the turnover tax struggle, deriving from the Lütticke case; Case C-57/65 Lütticke v Hauptzollamt 
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the CJEU could therefore further deepen the integration in all EU member states. This gives the 
incentive for both the member state whose court referred the question, and non-party member 
states, to make use of the submitting observations-tool. Also, having the possibility to argue the 
member state’s opinion to the Court could be a way to gain support for an issue that the state 
had not been able to raise on a political level.254  
 
3.2.3. Utilization in practice 
Even though this tool seems both useful and valuable, the possibility to submit observations 
has been scarcely used. There has been quantitative research done by several scholars in order 
to find out both how often member states use this tool, and how the CJEU has responded to the 
observations. 
In a study by Mortelmans, in the 346 cases decided by the Court in the period 1962 – 1978, 
member states only submitted observations in 37,5% of all cases where their own national court 
referred the question to the CJEU, and in 5,59% of the cases when a court from another member 
state posed the question.255 The aforementioned possibility to influence the possible loss of 
sovereignty thus seems like a stronger incentive when the member states’ own national law or 
interests were directly affected,256 at least in the earlier Community years.257  
A later study, made by Nyikos, where cases from the 1961-1995 were covered, showed an 
increase in the use of submitting observations. Member states, in her research, submitted 
observations in 50,5% of the cases where their national court referred the question to the 
CJEU.258 The study did not examine the rate concerning the percentage of observations when 
the referring court was from another member state. The study did, however, look at the 
influence on the rulings that member states observations had in comparison with e.g. the opinion 
of the Commission. Nyikos found that the CJEU rules in accordance with the Commission’s 
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255 Stein, E., ‘Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’ (1981) 75:1 The American Journal 
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view in 72,4%, and only in the member state’s view in 44,1% of the cases.259 Neither Nyikos, 
nor Mortlemans did categorise their results so as it would be possible to find the rate for 
observations in cases concerning the principles of direct effect or supremacy. It is, however, 
important to acknowledge that most of the preliminary reference concern interpretation of EU 
law due to a possible non-conformity of national law, i.e. a question of direct effect together 
with supremacy. 
In the Stein study, eleven out of the most important CJEU cases concerning constitutional issues 
were scrutinised.260 The focus was on direct effect and supremacy. In all of these cases member 
states had submitted observations, and in eight of them the member states were against either 
the establishment or development of the issue.261 In one, the observations were both against and 
for a deepening.262 In the remaining two, the member states either found the questions 
unnecessary for the Court to decide,263 or without position concerning the deepening of the 
issue.264 The Commission and the Advocates Generals, however, were in favour of further 
development of the issues in ten and nine cases respectively.265 The CJEU went with the further 
expansion in all eleven cases, hence going directly against the will of the submitting member 
states in eight and a half cases.266 Stein does unfortunately not provide for any explanation or 
hypothesis for why that was. These cases were from the beginning of the Community era; it 
could be reasonable to concur that the CJEU wanted to take every chance at expanding and 
deepening the direct effect and supremacy principles in order for the Community to live up to 
the “new legal order” that it had been described as.267 
                                                 
259 Nyikos, S., The European Court of Justice and National Courts: Strategic Interaction within the European 
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267 Case C-26/62 van Gend en Loos, supra note 44, p. 12. 
48 
 
In a recent study made by Sieps, it was found, contrary to the results of the Stein study, that 
member states that made observations to the Court in fact did have a palpable chance at 
affecting the course of the CJEU judgements.268 The study concludes that “submitting 
observations makes a difference, in the sense that the Court is more likely to make a decision 
that preserves national sovereignty where several Member States argue in that direction (and 
vice versa if the observations favour more legal integration).”269 This study, though, does not 
look at the specific cases concerning direct effect or supremacy – however, as has been stated 
above, almost all preliminary references do concern these principles. 
The findings of the studies show that the Court did not often go with the views held by member 
states in the earlier Community years, at least not concerning the most important cases of 
constitutional value. In recent years, though, it seems like the Court more often has taken 
member state observations into account and ruled accordingly. One hypothesis for why that is, 
is that in the early days of the Community and the CJEU, the Court wanted to deepen the 
development of, for instance, direct effect and supremacy and did not “care” too much for what 
the member states wanted. The frames for these constitutional principles was therefore 
established and set. In recent years there have been less cases before the CJEU with the same 
great development-possibilities. The Court could therefore allow member state submissions to 
carry more weight in the rulings without losing important chances of further integration. This 
hypothesis would, in part, be supported by Pollack.270 
 
3.2.4. Actual influence – examples 
The principles of direct effect and supremacy have been created and developed through 
numerous cases in the CJEU. In the original case concerning direct effect, van Gend,271 The 
Netherland, Belgian and German governments submitted observations to the Court, i.e. half of 
the EU member states at that time. Both in the van Gend and the Costa case,272 member states 
emphasised that the referring questions were either outside of the Court’s jurisdiction or 
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inadmissible, rather than to argue for or against the issue at hand.273 The importance for the 
member states were, thus, a limitation on the integration rather a specific interest in custom 
tariffs or production and distribution of electric energy.  
In the second Defrenne case,274 observations were submitted by the United Kingdom and 
Ireland.  The case concerned a possible violation of equal treatment on grounds of gender, with 
a reference to art 119 EEC.275 The United Kingdom argued that art 119 did not fulfil the criteria 
for direct effect, found by the Court in the van Gend case. The expressed value of equal pay for 
equal work was to be seen as a general statement of principle and therefore not precise 
enough.276 The clarification was, however, made in a directive, but, the United Kingdom 
argued, in the case that additional legislation (required through art 8 in the directive) had not 
been implemented by a member state, art 119 EEC would still not be precise or clear enough 
as to have direct effect.277 They further argued that art 119 EEC should not have direct effect 
because the risk of retroactive application could lead to economic devastation for the member 
states.278 Ireland also held that art 119 EEC should not have direct effect, primarily with 
reference to the wording of the article and the fact that it was addressed to member states.279 
Ireland further stated, as the United Kingdom did, that granting art 119 EEC direct effect would 
result in a financial burden that, for many employers, would be impossible to bear.280 
The Court addressed all observations submitted by the member states. First it stated that just 
because the word “principle” is used, that does not automatically preclude the possibility of 
direct effect.281 It also denounced the argument that the article could not have direct effect only 
because it was addressed to member states.282 Not attributing the article with direct effect 
would, contrarily, prevent the effectiveness of the provision.283 As a result, the Court found art 
119 EEC to have direct effect. It did however agree with the member states’ view that 
retroactive claims could lead to damning economic consequences, and therefore determined 
that direct effect of art 119 EEC could only be relied upon in claims after the date of the 
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judgement, or in claims that has already been made.284 The Court did, seemingly, therefore take 
the member states’ claims into due consideration before reaching its conclusion.  
In the von Colson case,285 a case also concerning a violation of equal treatment on grounds of 
gender, here in relation to employment, the Court ruled in line with the submitted views of the 
member states. The plaintiff in the case was refused a job due to her gender. She therefore 
claimed a direct effective right to the employment referring to directive 76/207/EEC that was 
not yet transcribed into national law, also making it a question concerning supremacy. 
Germany, Denmark and the United Kingdom had sent their observations to the court on the 
interpretation of the directive. Germany held that member states have a margin of discretion, 
found in art 189 EEC, regarding legal consequences stemming from a breach of the principle 
of equal treatment.286 Germany further submitted that it should be up to national courts to find 
adequate solutions satisfying both the principle of equal treatment and the parties’ interests.287 
Last, Germany held, the application of equal treatment and its consequences should only follow 
if the victim was better qualified than the other applicants, and not if the qualifications were 
equal between them.288 Denmark submitted that the directive left the choice of sanctions to the 
member states, and that breaches of equal treatment should be penalized in the same way as 
they penalize breaches of national rules in related areas not governed by Community law.289 
The United Kingdom agreed with both Germany and Denmark concerning that member states 
should chose appropriate measures themselves. The directive, the United Kingdom continued, 
did not give indications as to what kind of measures the member states should adopt.290  
The Court agreed with the submitted views and concluded that the directive did not “require 
discrimination on grounds of sex regarding access to employment being made the subject of a 
sanction by way of an obligation imposed upon the employer who is the author of the 
discrimination to conclude a contract of employment with the candidate discriminated 
against.”291 The Court thus denied any direct effective right to a certain remedy under the 
directive. This example is not in line with the aforementioned view that the member state 
observations rarely affect the ruling in the CJEU. It is nevertheless a clear example that the 
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CJEU indeed rules favourably to the member states in some cases of great importance, and 
therefore significant to highlight. 
Both previous examples have primarily concerned the principle of direct effect. There are cases 
though that directly concerns the principle of supremacy. For instance, the Austrian state 
contested the effect of the principle of supremacy292 in the Ciola case.293 In their submission 
they held that there was no reason why the principle of supremacy should be applied 
“automatically and without restriction” to specific individual administrative acts.294 To support 
their argument they referred to the enforceability of administrative acts, and specifically to the 
concept of procedural autonomy of the member state. The Austrian state further submitted that 
to claim that EU law overrides an enforceable administrative act would cause for a questioning 
of the principles of legal certainty, protection of legitimate expectations or protection of 
lawfully acquired rights.295 The CJEU, however, held the view that, due to e.g. the EU Treaties 
being directly applicable in member states and EU law taking precedence over national law, a 
legal protection that is derivable from Union law, and that national courts must ensure, should 
be refused because of the nature of the conflicting provision of national law.296 The Austrian 
state’s position was therefore disregarded though, seemingly, duly taken into consideration. 
 
3.2.5. Limited use and effects? 
As has been made clear through the review of the studies under the 3.2.3-subheading, this tool 
may not have the greatest effect on CJEU rulings. Two aspects are important to acknowledge, 
the lack of observations from the member states and the limited effects the submitted 
observations seemingly have on the CJEU judgements. 
First, it is worth mentioning that in the earliest cases, for instance the van Gend case, the 
member states did not know the importance of submitting an observation. This mainly because 
the Court had not yet developed principles of great invasive nature before.297 The fact that not 
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all member states did use this tool in the earliest years could therefore be explained and excused. 
However, the fact that member states, after that first period, still did not submit observations to 
a greater extent could be seen as unfortunate. One member of the Commission’s legal staff 
commented on the situation, and deemed it regrettable that it was not transcribed into the rules 
of the Court that member states should guarantee their participation.298 Due to the amount of 
questions referred to the CJEU every year, it might be impossible in practice for member states 
to submit observations in all cases – that would possibly not be economically defendable. 
Member states do, however, need to use the observation tool to a greater extent, if only to aid 
the interaction between the CJEU and the member states. It is therefore fortunate that this tool 
seems to be gaining popularity. 
When member states do submit observations, the actual effect on the CJEU ruling has been 
found to be limited. It is worth remembering that the fact that the Court ruled in favour of further 
integration does not automatically entail that the Court did not take the member states’ 
arguments and wishes into account.299 In other words, the view of the member states might not 
always be the “correct” interpretation, and the fact that the CJEU rules in opposition of the 
member states does not mean that the CJEU are acting wrongfully. Furthermore, as Burley and 
Mattli concludes, member states can often have an opposing view to a certain interpretation of 
a Union provision before the CJEU hands down its ruling, but afterwards not upholding this 
view and instead adhering to the CJEU’s judgement. 300 
The reason for why the Court rarely rules in line with member state observations has not been 
established. One plausible explanation is that the Court naturally favours an increased 
integration (which most often is what the discrepancy is about), and member states their 
sovereignty. The observations should be of some importance to the Court since they sometimes 
provide important information on national legal traditions. It must be remembered, though, that 
member states do have their own interests in different areas that, for obvious reasons, will shine 
through in their observations. Also, member states will not always provide observations that 
favour the same interpretation.301 The CJEU, on the other hand, is not supposed to have a 
                                                 
298 Stein, E., ‘Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’, supra note 255, p. 26. 
299 Cramér, P., et al, ‘See you in Luxembourg? EU Governments’ observations under the Preliminary Reference 
Procedure’, supra note 70, p. 33. 
300 A well-known example is from the van Gend case. Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands all strongly objected 
to the notion of direct effect, but none of them subsequently suggested having the decision overturned; Case C-
26/62 van Gend en Loos, supra note 44; Burley, A., Mattli W., ‘Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of 
Legal Integration’ (1993) 47:1 International Organization, 41, p. 68. 
301 See e.g. Case C-2/74 Reyners v Belgian state (1974) ECLI:EU:C:1974:68. 
53 
 
preferred opinion in substance, but will, as has been stated, favour increased integration. An 
accurate question that emerges might be: Should member state observations have a greater 
effect on CJEU rulings? Concerning the possible 28 (soon 27) different national interests, 
maybe that answer should be no. 
 
3.3. The efficiency aspect 
How efficient are the two tools concerning their influence on the development of principles? 
That question has been touched upon earlier, under 3.1.4. and 3.2.5, though not specifically and 
thoroughly in relation to the development of the principles of direct effect and supremacy. A 
deeper assessment will therefore be provided. 
It has been established that the Court’s primary possibility to establish and develop principles 
is through the preliminary ruling procedure. Without questions – no further deepening of the 
interpretation and/or application of the principles. The effectiveness of the entire EU legal order 
is therefore critically dependent on this procedure.302 Member states are also obliged to refer 
questions – this is clearly stated in the Treaties.303 Not referring questions, i.e. using the non-
referral tool, is therefore, in theory, very efficient if member states want to influence the 
development of principles. Even though the principle of supremacy, since mainly the Costa304 
and the Simmenthal case,305 seems rather set as is, the Ciola case306 is a clear example that the 
principle is still developing and expanding. Had the national court in the Ciola case not referred 
the question to the CJEU, it is highly possible that specific individual administrative acts would 
not be attributed supremacy in Austria. The limits to this tool have been discussed above, 
however, there is a point in discussing them further. Should one court refer a question to the 
CJEU concerning a specific matter, that question is to be seen as dealt with. Courts that did not 
refer questions on the same matter before are then obliged to comply with the interpretation 
made by the CJEU. This vastly shows the weakness of this tool. But what if certain questions 
do not arise in multiple cases? What if, due to specific circumstances,307 certain questions only 
                                                 
302 Stone Sweet, A., Brunell, T., ‘Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance 
in the European Community’ (1998) 92:1 The American Political Science Review, 63, p. 66. 
303 E.g. in art 267 TFEU. 
304 Case C-6/64 Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L., supra note 51. 
305 Case C-106/77 Simmenthal, supra note 53. 
306 Case C-224/97 Ciola, supra note 293. 
307 E.g. geographical, social or cultural circumstances. 
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arise in specific regions and only in a limited number of cases? That would indeed be a band-
aid to the chip in the effectiveness of the non-referral tool.  
In theory, there could probably be such cases. There could, for instance, be smaller regions 
where a certain type of plant or animal only exist, and an EU provision might need to be 
interpreted in relation to said biological being. Another example might be if only a limited 
number of member states have certain cultural objects, protected by EU directives. Should a 
question arise concerning such objects, the interest might not be vastly spread. Having said that, 
these cases would concern items, beings and other objects – not abstract concepts. There would 
be harder to argue that certain questions concerning the development of direct effect or 
supremacy only emerge in a significantly small number of cases. Even though, for instance, the 
direct effect concerning a specific provision in a specific type of legislation rarely is questioned, 
the Court does not only apply the possible direct effect to that provision. In the van Duyn case,308 
the Court did not only find art 3 in the Council directive 64/221/EC to have a vertical direct 
effect, but that all directives had if they fulfilled the criteria for direct effect. The fact that 
questions before other national courts might concern other matters than the free movement of 
workers is therefore irrelevant. 
The effectiveness of non-referral in relation to the development of the principles of direct effect 
and supremacy is hence to be seen as immense in theory, but only barely existing in practice. 
The second tool, submitting observations, might entail a different conclusion. Member states 
have been clear on their position, through observations, when it comes to the development of 
direct effect and supremacy. As was shown in the Stein study, member states have consistently 
been against further development of the principles, i.e. against a deeper integration, whilst the 
CJEU equally consistent has been for. Considering that, the effectiveness of the observations 
might not be as great as the member states probably want. Nevertheless, as was illustrated above 
with the von Colson case, there are examples of when the CJEU has favoured the member state 
proposed interpretation in cases of great importance. It is hard to know how great the actual 
influence is since the CJEU can, and hopefully always does, take member state observations 
into due consideration. The submitted observations are however only one member state’s 
preferred input, and not what might be in the interest of either the majority of member states or 
of the EU as a union. In other words, the tool of submitting observations might not be able to 
                                                 
308 Case C-41/74 van Duyn, supra note 71. 
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fulfil the purpose of giving member states a possibility to efficiently influence the development 
of principles. Having said that, it nevertheless still might be important for the member states.  
As has been stated above, submitting observations is a possibility for member states to get 
certain topics on the table that they might not have been able to do on the political arena. This 
is a very important function. Even though, in practice, the observations do not have the desired 
impact on CJEU rulings, they can still influence the debate. Because member state observations, 
just like the order for references, are sent to all member states,309 the submitting member state 
can force a discussion on the possible development of direct effect and supremacy. If the 
referring questions concern said principles and e.g. risk an expansion of their impact, member 
states who submit observations can use that opportunity to reach out to other member states and 
either seek support, or bluntly force the other member states to join the discussion. That can, in 
turn, spark a discussion on other levels, e.g. on a higher political level. The flaw with this, 
however, is that no member state is forced to submit observations. Should a member state want 
to stay out of the discussion on a possible deepened integration, for any reasons, they are free 
to do so. This kind of use of the tool has however been both verified and recognised as 
significant.310 
The effectiveness of the submitting observations-tool in relation to the development of the 
principles of direct effect and supremacy is hence to be seen as limited. It might, however, fill 
another important function on the matter, namely as an incentive for other member states to 
engage in the discussion, and to maybe get it up on the political table. 
It is important to remember that other tools in the member state tool box might affect the 
effectiveness of non-referral and submitting observations. For instance, there are studies311 that 
                                                 
309 Curia ”Notes for the guidance of counsel”, February 2009, available at 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2008-09/txt9_2008-09-25_17-37-52_275.pdf p. 11. 
310 Myers, W., Buti, E., ‘Domestic Legal Infrastructures and Member State Observations’, supra note 253, p. 8. 
311 See e.g. Carrubba, C., Gabel, M., Hankla, C., ‘Judicial Behavior under Political Constraints: Evidence from the 
European Court of Justice’ (2008) 102:4 American Political Science Review, 435. 
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show that the Court may rule in line with member state observation to avoid the risk of non- 
compliance312 or override.313  
All in all, the two studied tools are important and integral to the member states concerning their 
possible influence on the CJEU’s development of principles, but might not be the most efficient 
tools available. 
 
3.4. Summary 
In this section the two tools – non-referral and submitting observations – have been examined. 
Both tools stem from the preliminary ruling procedure. The preliminary ruling procedure is 
regulated primarily by art 267 TFEU. 
Courts may refrain from referring questions to the CJEU if the provisions in question fulfil 
certain criteria. The most common exempt is if the provisions are clear and in no need of 
interpretation, i.e. the acte clair doctrine. 
There are several examples of national courts that did not refer a question to the CJEU when 
that would have been in order. The reason for the lack of questions is most likely due to the 
national courts’ fear of losing influence and authority. When national courts refrain from posing 
questions to the CJEU, they effectively limit the Court’s power to develop the Union legal 
order, including e.g. the principles of direct effect and supremacy. Non-referral could therefore 
be seen as an important tool for national courts. However, it only takes one question from one 
court for the CJEU to have the possibility rule on delicate matters. As has been shown, courts 
of lower instances do have several incentives for referring questions. All in all, the non-referral 
tool, when used by all courts are both important and effective but, in practice both weak and 
not as effective as the national (higher) courts might want. 
                                                 
312 Concerning non-compliance, see e.g. Pollack, M., The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, 
and Agenda Setting in the EU, supra note 151, p. 178; Conant, L., Justice contained: Law and politics in the 
European Union (The United States of America, Cornell University Press, 2002), especially in ch 2.; Rasmussen, 
H., On law and policy in the European Court of Justice. A comparative study in judicial policy making, supra note 
9, p. 400-ff; Kilroy, B., Integration Through the Law: Court and Governments in the EU, supra note 259, p. 6.; 
Garrett, G., Weingast, B., ‘Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the EC’s Internal Market’ in Goldstein, 
J., Keohane, R., (eds.). Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 1993), p. 178. 
313 Override, i.e. revising or amending the Treaties, has also been called “the nuclear option”; See e.g. Pollack, M., 
‘Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community’, supra note 151, p. 118-19, however, 
described as an ineffective instrument and a noncredible means of member state control. Also Garrett, G., 
Weingast, B., ‘Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the EC’s Internal Market’, supra note 306, p 202. 
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The second tool, to submit observations to the CJEU, is a possibility for member states to argue 
their favoured interpretation of the Union law and possibly affect the Court’s rulings. Different 
interpretations of EU provisions could result in a loss of member state’s sovereignty, and further 
deepen the integration, why member states have an incentive to submit observations. 
Even though the incentive might be great, the possibility to submit observations has been 
scarcely used. In the period 1962-1978, member states submitted observations in 37,5% of all 
cases where their own national court referred the question to the CJEU, and in 5,59% of the 
cases when a court from another member state posed the question. That number has gone up 
over the years, but it still far from a hundred percent. 
In cases where member states do submit observations, the Court does not rule accordingly in a 
majority of cases. Nyikos found, in her study of cases between 1961-1995, that the CJEU ruled 
in line with member state observations in 44,1% of the cases. In the Stein study, where eleven 
of the most important cases from a constitutional perspective were examined, the Court ruled 
directly against the wishes of the member states in eight cases. In all eleven cases, the Court 
ruled in favour of further integration and a deepening of the principles of direct effect and 
supremacy. In the more recent study by Sieps, the result showed that member state observations 
nevertheless had the power to affect the CJEU ruling. 
Three examples, that clearly show the situation and relationship between the CJEU and member 
states are the Defrenne II, the von Colson, and the Ciola case. In Defrenne II, the court ruled 
against the member state observation in the main question, but acknowledged the possible 
effects of the ruling and limited the retroactive effect in line with the member states. In von 
Colson, the Court ruled in line with the member state observations, denying the possible direct 
effect to an EU provision. In Ciola, the Court disregarded the submitted observation and ruled 
against the wishes of the member state. 
Concerning the submitting observations-tool, it does not seem to have the greatest influence on 
CJEU rulings. Member states have not been using the tool to its fullest extent. There seem to 
be a rise in the number of submitted observations now in relation to the earlier Community 
years, which is an important aid in the interaction between the CJEU and the member states. 
The possibly limited effect that observations have on CJEU rulings might be misleading. The 
fact that the Court often rules in favour of further integration does not automatically entail that 
the Court did not take the member states’ arguments into account before handing down its 
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ruling. In other words, the fact that the CJEU rules in opposition of the member states does not 
mean that the CJEU are acting wrongfully. The reason for this limited effect has, however, not 
been established. One explanation could be that the Court naturally favours an increased 
integration, and member states their sovereignty. Member states do also have their own interests 
in different areas that will shine through in their observations. Since the EU has 28 member 
states, with 28 possible interpretational preferences, maybe this tool should not have a greater 
effect on CJEU rulings than it already has. 
If one looks at the tools from an efficiency point of view, it is clear that using the non-referral 
tool is, in theory, very efficient if member states want to influence the development of 
principles. In practice, though, it is enough that one court within the Union refers a question on 
a certain topic for that to be seen as dealt with by the Court, and for every national court with 
cases concerning the same legal question to follow the CJEU interpretation. When it comes to 
member states’ possible influence on the CJEU development of the principles of direct effect 
and supremacy it barely exists in practice, and is therefore not efficient. 
For the submitting observations-tool, it has been shown through studies that the CJEU 
infrequently rules in line with the member state interpretation. Member states have been 
submitting observations against a further integration, and against an expansion of the principles 
of direct effect and supremacy whilst the CJEU consistently has ruled in favour of this. From 
that perspective, the effectiveness of the observations might not be as great as the member states 
probably want. Although, the CJEU has ruled in line with member state wishes in some cases 
of great importance, like the von Colson case. The observations do, however, also fill the 
function of giving the member states a possibility to get certain topics on the table that they 
might not have been able to do on the political arena. 
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4. Legal certainty and democracy – applying perspectives 
Under the second section the two theories – legal interpretivism and legal positivism – was 
introduced. Their views were applied to the CJEU’s development of principles. It is, however, 
time to use the same legal theories on the non-referral and submitting observations-tools. The 
tools will be examined in relation to the perspectives of legal certainty and democracy, referring 
back to the theories in the second section. 
 
4.1. Legal certainty 
The principle of legal certainty here, as has been stated, will depart from legitimate expectations 
in relation to legal interpretivism and legal positivism.314 The principle of legal certainty is not 
found in the EU Treaties, or any other EU provision. Instead it can be found in the CJEU case 
law, by a derivation of member state legal traditions,315 and is considered as a general principle 
of EU law.316 
 
4.1.1. Legal interpretivism 
First, when the CJEU found the principles of direct effect and supremacy, that was rightfully 
done from a legal interpretivist perspective. It is what the Court was supposed to do, and 
therefore in line with legal certainty. Now, looking at the two member state tools, both of them 
were designed to interfere with this court practice. Non-referral removes the Court’s possibility 
to rightfully do its job. When national courts refrain from referring questions on direct effect 
and supremacy, it is thus not to be seen as legally certain, since it risks affecting the 
jurisprudence that already is in line with legal certainty. The same can be said for the submission 
of observations. Through the observations, member states try to affect an already legally certain 
development, which undermines the system. 
 
                                                 
314 See supra, section 1.4.5. 
315 Raitio, J., ‘The Principle of Legal Certainty as a General Principle of EU Law’, supra note 62, p. 48. 
316 See e.g. case C-13/61 De Geus en Uitdenbogerd v Bosch and Others (1962) ECLI:EU:C:1962:11, para 52, Case 
C-323/88 Sermes, supra note 64, p. 3050; Raitio, J., ‘The Principle of Legal Certainty as a General Principle of 
EU Law’, supra note 62, p. 52-69. 
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4.1.2. Legal positivism 
The CJEU’s development of principles, from a legal positivist perspective, can be seen as in 
line with what judges are supposed to do, and thus what to be expected from them. It is hard to 
argue that the CJEU would not fulfil Hart’s rule of recognition when developing the principles 
of direct effect and supremacy, even though a legal positivist would argue that the CJEU created 
the principles rather than “found” them within the system. The development of principles can 
therefore be seen as in line with legal certainty. For member states to refrain from referring 
questions to the CJEU can, however, also be in line with legal certainty. This because a decision 
of a non-referral comes from a national court, and the national judge does have discretionary 
powers. The second tool, to submit observations could also be in line with legal certainty. The 
judges of the CJEU, when finding a gap of which they need to create proper norms, are supposed 
to do so as if they were the legislator. They are supposed to look at all arguments and 
information that is available to them in order to create the most fitting norms. Member state 
observations would then be a great source of information; information that the legislator would 
have had if the question came up in the political sphere. To submit observations, and provide 
the Court with valid interpretations would then be in line with the principle of legal certainty. 
This also because, ultimately, the Court has the discretional power of deciding what 
interpretation would be correct. 
 
4.2. Democracy 
As has been established, the principle of democracy has been transcribed into the Treaties, and 
the different interpretations of the principle of democracy have been presented under section 
2.4. The question here is thus if the member state tools are in line with democracy. 
 
4.2.1. Legal interpretivism 
For legal interpretivists, the goal with democracy is freedom. The tool of non-referral is often 
used by member states as a way of not losing sovereignty. This can especially be said about 
cases concerning the principles of direct effect and supremacy. Withholding the CJEU’s 
possibility to develop two principles, which directly give individuals freedom, would therefore 
be a practice that goes against the legal interpretivists notion of democracy. Turning to member 
states submitted observations, it is first necessary to restate that member state observations in 
cases concerning the development of direct effect and supremacy has mostly concerned a 
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limitation to said principles. Since these limitations do not increase freedom for individuals, but 
rather the opposite, it cannot be seen as in line with democracy. The Court, according to legal 
interpretivists, only finds principles that are already there and thus rightfully give EU members 
their existing right to freedom. 
Should member state observations, however, be in line with the principles of direct effect and 
supremacy, those observations as such do not go against the principle of democracy. It is, 
however, impossible to judge a tool based on the “best case scenario”. A knife is a tool that 
could be used for “good” things, but when it comes to discussing the use and possible limitation 
of their use, one must look at the risk of people misusing them, for example to injure others. 
The tool of submitting observation creates a possibility for member states to influence the CJEU 
in its development of principles. Since the Court already has been described as Dworkian, and 
time and again has shown its inclination to expand the freedom and rights for EU members, 
member state observations are not needed for fostering this. Instead, it seems like they, in 
practice, only fill the role of trying to reduce individuals’ rights. Therefore, the tool is not 
considered in line with the legal interpretivists concept of democracy. 
In sum, both instruments available for member states restrict the freedom that CJEU, by creating 
principles, ensures. The use of them are therefore not in line with the principle of democracy. 
 
4.2.2. Legal positivism 
From a legal positivist perspective, the goal with democracy is unity. Non-referral often 
happens due to not wanting to lose sovereignty. A development of the principles of direct effect 
and supremacy would entail a sovereignty-loss for the member states which, from the 
perspective of the state would limit the unity. In that sense, non-referral could be good even 
when being ambitiously (and even wrongfully) used, because for national courts to refer 
everything concerning direct effect or supremacy would decrease the stability of the unity. 
However, if one applies an EU-perspective instead of a national one, the non-referral tool might 
not be in line with the concept of democracy. Non-referral would risk leading to different 
outcomes in different national courts that are handling the same legal questions. This would in 
turn ensure uncertainty within the Union, not in line with the value of unity. From that 
perspective, the non-referral would not be considered to be in line with the concept of 
democracy. 
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Concerning the submission of observations, it could be seen as in line with the legal positivist 
notion of democracy. From the perspective of the state, having the possibility to argue their 
favoured interpretation of EU provisions would secure the unity within the state. Also, not being 
able to submit observations, and thus not being able to argue their case, would risk triggering 
non-compliance within the member states, which would lead to a form of anarchy within the 
union. This partly since member states would have a significantly limited chance at influencing 
the development of principles, in relation to the creation of “regular” legislation. There would 
thus be a point to adhering to the unity of the sovereign state – without a clear view from the 
member states, the unity cannot be upheld.  
 
4.3. Possible deductions, or what this means 
It is clear that the tools of non-compliance and submitting observations mostly favour member 
state interests rather than EU members, i.e. on a unity-level rather that from an individual 
perspective. The tools, therefore, seem to be in line with legal certainty and democracy from a 
legal positivist perspective. Concerning the creation of principles in the first place, that is more 
in line with the legal interpretivist view on legal certainty and democracy. 
It is clear that, depending on what standpoint one prefers, both the development of principles 
and member states’ potential influence through the two tools can be legitimized, even if one 
disregards them being legal through EU provisions and customary practice. The point is to 
satisfy as many parties as possible, on a union, state and individual level. The CJEU creating 
principles, and member states having the possibilities to influence that phenomenon, might then 
be a fair implementation of the Goldilocks principle, i.e. the only possible design as to not be 
too totalitarian or extreme in any direction.  
 
4.4. Summary 
The concept of legal certainty and democracy, from the perspective of legal interpretivism and 
legal positivism has been applied to the two tools of non-referral and submitting observations. 
Concerning legal certainty from a legal interpretivists point of view, the two tools are not in 
line with it. This because the development of principles by the CJEU is in line with legal 
certainty and the two tools actively limits the Court’s possibility to rightfully do its job of 
finding principles. For legal positivist, however, the two tools can be seen as in line with the 
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principle of legal certainty. Non-referral because that tool is used by a national court and 
national judges do have discretional powers, and submitting observations because it provides 
the CJEU with valid information that, had the question been brought before the legislator, would 
have been provided, and thus expected. 
On the concept of democracy, the legal interpretivist notion is a strive towards freedom.  The 
non-referral tool is often used by member states to ensure their sovereignty, and, as a 
consequence, withholding the CJEU the possibility to develop principles that directly give 
individuals freedom. That is not in line with the principle of democracy. Concerning member 
state observations, the same can be concluded. The tool of submitting observations risks 
limiting the development of principles, and thus freedom, and is therefore not in line with 
democracy. 
From a legal positivist perspective, the goal with democracy is unity. In that sense, non-referral 
could be in line with democracy since it can be used by member states to increase stability and 
unity within the state. If one, however, applies an EU-perspective instead of a national one, the 
non-referral tool might not be in line with the concept of democracy since it would risk leading 
to different outcomes in different national courts, causing uncertainty and instability. 
Submitting observations could be seen as in line with democracy from a legal positivist 
perspective. For states to not being able to argue their case, there is a risk of triggering non-
compliance and thus create a form of “anarchy” within the Union.  
Both the development of principles by the CJEU and the member states’ potential influence 
through the two tools can be seen as legitimate, depending on which theory one emanates from. 
In order to satisfy as many parties as possible, both on a union, state and individual level, this 
construction might be the fairest, and thus in line with the Goldilocks principle. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
This thesis has had three targets. First, to examine the legal interpretivist and legal positivist 
views on principles and to connect that to the CJEU’s development of the principles of direct 
effect and supremacy. The view on the CJEU’s development of principles, whether it is an act 
of creating or “finding” existing norms and whether or not it is in line with democracy, is 
demonstrably different if the answer comes from a legal interpretivist or a legal positivist. What 
can be said though, is that both theories acknowledge the Court’s right to develop principles, 
and use them the way that the CJEU does. 
Second, the goal was to scrutinise the member states’ possible influence on the CJEU’s process 
to develop principles, especially the principles of direct effect and supremacy, through the 
preliminary reference procedure, focusing on the tools of non-referral and submitting of 
observations. Member states do have a palpable chance at influencing the Court’s development 
of principles, even though both instruments might leave some for the member state to desire 
concerning their efficiency. 
Third, the last target of the thesis was to apply the concepts of legal certainty and democracy, 
from the legal interpretivist and legal positivist point of view, on the tools of non-compliance 
and submitting observations. In short, the tools can be seen as conform with democracy and 
legal certainty to legal positivists, and oppose to them to legal interpretivists. This result might 
seem insignificant or even futile, but should rather be seen as the contrary. It clearly delineates 
the fact that there is no “right” answer when discussing the development of principles. To 
establish that is of a great theoretical value, how trivial it might seem. The thesis has also, in 
substance, provided with the views of two of the principal legal philosophical theories in the 
field, on the subject of principles in relation to the CJEU and the EU member states, which has 
been a tentative endeavour to make a small contribution to the legal philosophical sphere. 
Hopefully this has also resulted in a deeper understanding for the reader, concerning the CJEU’s 
development of principles and member states’ influential possibilities, creating somewhat of a 
full circle. 
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6. Future directions 
This thesis has dealt with eight concepts; legal interpretivism, legal positivism, direct effect, 
supremacy, non-referral, observations, legal certainty and democracy. With eight focal points, 
there is a risk that the text, instead of following a red thread, turns into a ball of rainbow-colored 
scraps of yarn. Hopefully that has not been the case.  
Since the thesis has been constructed around these eight concepts, in four different categories, 
there are four palpable ways of further expanding this thesis. 
Theories: Even though, when talking about principles, legal interpretivism and legal positivism 
seem like two of the most well-equipped theories for dealing with this topic, there are several 
other theories worth looking at. If one, for example, would apply critical legal studies or legal 
realism on the matter, a completely different conclusion would probably be reached. 
Principles: This thesis has emanated from the principles of direct effect and supremacy, two 
principles that are characteristic for the EU. Had one instead looked at other principles, like the 
principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of age, established by the CJEU in the Mangold 
case,317 one would most likely get a different result in relation to the compatibility of the legal 
interpretivist and legal positivist view on the creation of principles and democracy, which, in 
turn, would affect the theories’ take on the member state tools. 
Tools: As has been mentioned earlier, there are several other tools available for member states 
when wanting to influence the CJEU’s development of principles. If one had examined, for 
example, the non-compliance concept or the instrument of override, they might render different 
results concerning their compatibility with the theories’ understanding of legal certainty and 
democracy. 
Perspectives: Last but not least are the perspectives, here legal certainty and democracy. They 
are certainly not the only perspectives of value to apply in a thesis like this. In the preamble of 
the Treaties, other concepts, like freedom, equality and the rule of law, are described as 
important values for the Union. Had one examined the member state tools from those 
perspectives, it is not certain that the same results would have been reached. 
Having delved into the possibilities of expanding the thesis further, it might have left a lingering 
question about the thesis actual universal application. If the results are, seemingly, completely 
                                                 
317 Case C-144/04 Mangold, supra note 142. 
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dependent on the eight concepts being present, can they at all be applicable to other situations, 
where one or more of them are replaced? Maybe not. But that was never the intention of the 
thesis. Having said that, it is absolutely possible to draw parallels between the results of this 
thesis and other situations that involves principles, the CJEU and member state influence. The 
results, in that sense, would thus have, if not a universal application, a role as a source of 
inspiration for other scholars. And that is all a thesis writer could hope for, is it not? 
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